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Content and Broadband and Service ...Oh My!

Will a United AOL-Time Warner Become the Wicked
Witch of the Web, or Pave a Yellow Brick Road?
I. Introduction
In early January 2000, computer power America Online announced plans to acquire
media giant Time Warner.' Valued between $160 and $180 billion, the proposed
merger would be the largest ever.2 Naturally, given the size and influence of the two
companies, the fanfare surrounding the move was equally great. America Online's
chairman Steve Case proclaimed that the merger would "launch the next Internet revolution," while Time Warner chairman Gerald Levine cooed that "[tihese two companies
are a natural fit."' 3 Following the announcement, stock prices of both computer and
media companies soared as frenzied market-watchers buzzed about what other mergers
might ensue.4 In addition, analysts exalted the sense of the proposed union: not only did
each company offer what the other most coveted, 5 but the terms of the deal also pleased
those who believed that internet companies were slightly overvalued.6
Not all reactions to the announcement were equally positive, however, as critics
quickly appeared to decry the union. Some analysts predicted that the marriage was
doomed to fail because of stark differences in the two companies' cultures.7 Still others
urged that the merger should be stopped at all costs due to concerns over the potential

1. See, e.g., AOL Buys Time Warner for $166 Billion in Stock, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 2000, at IC;
Andrew Glass, Fusing of Media, Online Outlets Raises Questions, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Jan. 11, 2000, at
4A; Steven Syre & Charles Stein, Blockbuster Deal: AOL and Time Warner Merge, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11,
2000, at D 1.
2. Compare AOL Buys Time Warnerfor $166 Billion in Stock, supra note 1 (valuing merger at $166
billion) with Syre & Stein, supra note 1 (valuing merger at $178 billion).
3. AOL Buys Time Warnerfor $166 Billion in Stock, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Chuck Philips, Media Mega-Merger: Impact on Music, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at Cl
(suggesting that the merger "sets the stage for the possible takeover of other entertainment companies"); Syre
& Stein, supra note 1 (quoting several analysts regarding the potential catalytic effect of the AOL-Time
Warner merger).
5. See AOL Buys Time Warner for $166 Billion in Stock, supra note 1 (quoting one analyst that the
merger "makes a lot of sense [because] AOL [will]
provide[ I a huge platform for all of Time Warner's
content, and Time Warner's cable systems provide a good network for AOL's on-line services"); Syre &
Stein, supra note 1 ("The logic seems simple. The old media companies [like Time Warner] need access to
the distribution system of the future, which is clearly the Internet. Leading Internet companies that have
amassed millions of customers need to pump more content through their Web portals to continue building
revenues. Their mergers would be a marriage of convenience, if not downright necessity.").
6. See, e.g., Merging Past and Future, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 2000, at 22 (answering the
question "is internet money the same as real money?" with "no: in this so-called 'merger of equals,' every
AOL dollar of pre-deal market capitalisation is worth less than three-quarters of each Time Warner dollar").
7. See id. ("Achieving a genuine merger between two such different companies will be very difficult.
Quite apart from the personalities involved, AOL is essentially a single-product company and Time Warner is
home to a bunch of feuding baronies."); Philips, supra note 4 ("Analysts and competitors cautioned that the
newly merged organization could run into serious problems, however, if AOL and Time Warner fail to
integrate the drastically different cultures of the two corporations.").
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for monopolistic pricing,8 threats to continued open-access to the Internet, 9 and even
journalistic integrity.' 0
This Note analyzes the complex legal and practical issues surrounding the proposed
AOL-Time Warner merger. In order to fully convey the breadth of the two companies
and the merger's resulting significance to the average person, Part II first recounts the
history and current status of both, emphasizing each firm's products as well as the competition each faces in its various markets. Part II then concludes by describing the postmerger "vision" articulated by AOL and Time Warner in anticipation of the union. Part
III analyzes the antitrust issues surrounding the proposed merger itself and then, given
the forecasts by many that the merger will sail through governmental scrutiny, Part III
attempts to predict the long-term implications if the merger is allowed to proceed. Finally, Part IV concludes by summarizing the events surrounding Time Warner's recent
boycott of ABC and then suggesting that such a showing of power and arrogance should
cause the FrC to reject the merger outright.
H. The Firms
A. America Online
America Online, Incorporated ("AOL"), began its existence in May 1985 as a fledgling computer company called Quantum Computer Services ("Quantum") based in Dulles, Virginia." The brainchild of James Kimsey 12 and Steve Case,' 3 Quantum sought to
create "an interactive world where people all over the country could gather.' 4 To
8. See Elizabeth Douglass, Consumer Groups Alarmed Over AOL's "Pullback", L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2000, at C4 (noting concern that the merger "could lead to fewer choices and higher prices for consumers").
9. See id. (quoting several sources concerned about AOL's "pullback" from their endorsement of open
access following announcement of the merger"); Jube Shiver Jr., Despite Warnings, Opposition Unlikely, L.A.
TIMES, Jan 11, 2000, at C11.
10. See, e.g., Glass, supra note 1 (discussing the fear of academics and consumer groups that the merger
"could lead to undue media domination"); Shiver, supra note 9 (quoting Minnesota Sen. Paul Wellstone, who
was "very concerned about the effect these massive mergers will have on the flow of information in our
democracy").
11. For a timeline of AOL's history, see the AOL corporate webpage, (visited Feb. 23, 2000)
<http://www.corp.aol.com/whotimeline.html?>.
See also Michael Dresser, Being Aggressive: America
Online Has Grown Rapidly, But What Does Future Holdfor Company?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 24,
1994, at ID.
12. Kimsey, now 60, has now been named "Chairman Emeritus" of AOL, and has gone on to dabble in
foreign affairs. See Kathleen Day & Shannon Henry, Guerrilla Economics; U.S. Execs to Columbian Rebels:
Make Money, Not War, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2000, at El (detailing Kimsey's efforts to end fighting between
Marxist guerrillas and the government of Colombia); David Broder, Viet Vets Leave Legacy of Schools,
DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 1999, at B 11(describing Kimsey's role in funding Vietnamese schools being built by
American veterans).
13. Case, now 41 and the chairman and chief executive of AOL, began his career with marketing jobs at
Proctor & Gamble and PepsiCo. See No. 3 America Online Shooting for No. 1 Computer Service Is Trying to
be "Younger, Smarter" Than Competitors,SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 9, 1993, at 22. In 1983, however,
he left PepsiCo for the Control Video Corporation, a startup company that hoped to provide online services to
users of Atari videogame systems. See id. When the videogame market crashed so did Control Video, but
Case persevered, partnering with Kimsey to create Quantum. See id. While the failure of Control Video and
early struggles of AOL gave no hint of his future success, Case is now described as a visionary and is
compared to Bill Paley, the CBS chairman who led the television revolution. See id.; Amy Harmon, Media
Megadeal: The Chameleon; AOL Chief Relaxes a Dress Code But Not His Vision of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2000, at Al (describing Case's "combination of idealism and pragmatism"); Steve Lohr, Steve Case at
a Crossroad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at Di. While praising "Mr. Case's willingness to adapt to an everchanging environment," however, some have also commented that this strategy "has not come without
casualties," referring to the AOL executives Case has "pushed aside" at time to advance AOL's interests.
Harmon, supra.
14. Harmon, supra note 13.
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achieve this end, Quantum offered its first online service,' 5 named "Q-Link," later that

year.16 At the time, Quantum's three main competitors in the online service market
15. To fully appreciate the growth and success of AOL, one must understand some computing terms and
know a bit of computer history. To begin, the term "network" simply refers to a group of computers that
communicate with each other-unlike television, which is a "broadcast network" i.e. a single source sending
the same information to a number of different receivers, computers can form "interactive networks" in which
individual machines communicate back and forth with one another. See, e.g., JOHN R. LEVINE & CAROL
BAROUDI, THE INTERNET FOR DUMMIES 11-14 (2d ed. 1994).
In 1969, the Department of Defense ("DOD") established the Advanced Research Projects Administration
Network, or ARPANet, to test the reliability of computer networks and to link DOD contractors together. See
id. To fulfill these tasks, ARPANet was designed with two key functions: (1) Internet Protocol ("I'), a
universal computer language that would allow any given computer on the network to communicate with any
other, and (2) the "dynamic routing" of information. See ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: USER'S GUIDE
AND CATALOG 13-17 (2d ed. 1994). "Dynamic routing" became necessary because of DOD's fears that
network pathways might unpredictably become unavailable or even destroyed, e.g. by an enemy attack. See
id.; G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 31-32 (1995); LEVINE & BAROUDI, at
11-12. To respond to this concern, the ARPANet's developers designed the ARPANet without any central
hubs or essential pathways; instead, information travelling from one point to another moved through the
network of computers in short jumps, stopping briefly at each point along the way to evaluate which
subsequent connections were still operational. See ALLISON at 31-32; KROL at 13-14
Concurrent with the development of ARPANet, professors and researchers on college campuses were
anxious to move away from having to share a few giant computers and each have their own individual
workstations. See KROL at 14. To promote intracampus communication, individual schools created their own
"local area networks" (LANs), and equipped their workstations with UNIX, an extremely cheap operating
.system developed at the University of California Berkeley that included IP networking software. See id. As
this trend expanded to campuses across the country, private companies began doing the same thing-with so
many networks operating independently, it became obvious that linking all of them together would be
extremely beneficial. Because ARPANet had grown too old and slow to support such a venture, however, the
National Science Foundation ("NSF') intervened. To connect all of these divergent interests, NSF ultimately
created its own network, NSFNet, to replace ARPANet. See id. By 1987, however, even NSFNet was
overloaded by network traffic, and NSF began to contract upgrading of the system out to private companies.
See id. at 14-15; LEVINE & BAROUDI, at 13-14. These commercial interests expanded and upgraded the
network, but commercialization also had a secondary effect-whereas NSF had only allowed research and
educational content on the network, now commercial entities were permitted to use the space for their interests
as well. See KROL at 14-15. It is this commercial network, descended from ARPANet and NSFNet and now
global in scope, that is actually the "Internet."
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, computer users still had to understand the complicated UNIX language
to work on the Internet. See Rusty Coats, Language Key Weapon for Software Giants, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIBUNE, Dec. 26, 1995, at Computer Link 1 (quoting George Paolini of Sun Microsystems that "It's
surprising the Internet became popular at all [given that] UNIX was so archaic. But you either learned UNIX
or you stayed off the Internet."). Furthermore, the Internet lacked the kind of content that would have drawn
mass public attention, and what popular content did exist on the Internet was difficult to access. See id.
(detailing the many steps involved in simply viewing a picture under the UNIX system); Bradley Peniston &
Austin Bachmann, Intro to Internet: Netscape Advances Changing Face of Web, THE CAPITAL (Annapolis),
June 25, 1995, at B5 (noting the existence of only a few hundred websites before 1993). Because of these
limitations, the majority of the populace did not use or even know about the Internet.
To take advantage of this untapped market, "online service" companies such as AOL appeared and
provided a unique alternative for the technically-challenged mainstream. Instead of connecting to the Internet
directly, service customers could simply connect to their service via the telephone; the service would then
connect the customer to the Internet via the service's hardware and software. Such a process had both
advantages and disadvantages: while connecting to a service was cheaper and technologically easier than
owning all of the hardware and software and connecting directly to the Internet, the user was limited by the
capacities of the service. In addition to being middlemen between computer users and the then-barren
Internet, however, online service companies also created content for their customers to access once they were
connected. Although service customers logged on primarily for email, most companies also provided a range
of features such as news reporting, weather forecasts, bulletin boards, and games.
In the mid-1990s, with the invention of a special computer language called "hypertext markup language,"
or "html," the computer landscape changed dramatically. A new part of the Internet was born, the "World
Wide Web" ("Web"), in which users did not have to know UNIX; instead, Web users could simply point-andclick their way from webpage to webpage. See, e.g., Coats, supra; Peniston & Austin, supra. It should be
noted here that, although the Web is what most people commonly think of when they hear the term "Internet,"
the Web itself is still only one portion of the larger Internet network, namely the portion that is run using the
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were: (1) CompuServe, a Columbus, Ohio company that had been the first to offer businesses electronic mail, real-time chat capabilities, and network services, 17 (2) Prodigy, a
joint venture between International Business Machines Corporation and Sears, Roebuck,
and Company, 8 and (3) GEnie, owned by General Electric and known for its interactive
games and software offerings.' 9 Given CompuServe's headstart within the industry and
the resources of Prodigy and GEnie's parent companies, few gave Quantum any chance
of survival.2 °
2
Quantum forged ahead however, stressing user-friendliness as the key to success. '
In 1989 Quantum created a point-and-click version of the Q-Link service for Apple II
and Macintosh users, changing the name of the service to "America Online., 22 Two
years later, Quantum unveiled a DOS version of the America Online service and
changed its corporate name to match its now-signature product.23 But, despite going
public in March of 1992,24 by the end of that year AOL was still the smallest of the major online services.25
In 1993, though, after eight years of struggles, AOL looked to be finally hitting its
stride. It began the year by releasing a version of its software for the then-new Microsoft Windows operating system.26 Still stressing interactivity and ease of use, AOL
proved to be "'hipper, cooler, and faster on its feet"' than its competitors; 27 users, drawn
in by AOL's graphical interface with pull-down menus,28 seemed to be embracing Case
and Kimsey's idea of an electronic community. 29 By the end of 1993, AOL was "the
nation's fastest-growing commercial computer network," had doubled its revenues, and
had pushed its 30way into third place among the online service companies in terms of
subscribership.
hypertext language. Ultimately, because of hypertext's easy-to-use format, the Internet itself became more
accessible and content appealing to mainstream users appeared in greater and greater amounts. For more on
the hypertext revolution and its implications for AOL, see infra notes 40-45 and the accompanying text.
16. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11. Marketing the possibilities of an online community, Kimsey and
Case originally designed Q-Link to operate on Commodore computers, which at the time led the consumer
market. See id.; Dresser, supra note 11; Harmon, supra note 13.
17. See Compuserve Homepage: About Compuserve (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.compuserve.
com/corporate/ cs -info.html>.
18. See Harmon, supra note 13.
19. See Cathy Madison, Choosing the Right Service Takes Time, Research, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Dec. 6, 1992, at 4D.
20. See Dresser, supra note 11; Harmon, supra note 13.
21. See Dresser, supra note 11.
22. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11; Dresser, supra note 11.
23. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11.
24. See id.
25. See Madison, supra note 19.
26. See id.
27. Daniel Southerland, America Online's Rapid Rise: It's the Hottest Player in Dial-Up Computer
Services, But Stiff Competition Looms, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1993, at Fl (quoting Joshua Harris, an industry
analyst from a New York research firm); see also Dresser, supra note 11 ("The key to America Online's
success has been simplicity. Prodigy and Compuserve might have a richer store of information, but even
America Online's critics concede that it is the most user-friendly of the major on-line services."); Harmon,
supra note 13 ("But Prodigy, which was slower [than AOL] to introduce Internet access and e-mail, stumbled
as Mr. Case's company gathered momentum.").
28. See Madison, supra note 19; Southerland, supra note 27.
29. See No. 3 America Online Shootingfor No. 1 Computer Service Is Trying to be "Younger, Smarter"
Than Competitors, supra note 13 ("In eight years, Case helped construct a community of 400,000-without
laying a brick."); Southerland, supra note 27 (detailing online matchmaking anecdotes).
30. No. 3 America Online Shooting for No. I Computer Service Is Trying to be "Younger, Smarter"
Than Competitors, supra note 13 (detailing AOL's "having doubled in size in a year and adding more than
150,000 customers over the past six months-nearly 1,000 new subscribers a day"). Although AOL had
passed GEnie in subscribership, Case was only moderately pleased, saying "We don't want to stay number 3.
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Furthermore, during 1993 AOL overcame what had the potential to be a companyending nightmare. When it drastically reduced prices for its online service, users new
and old flooded AOL's telephone systems, causing long delays in logging on and slower
service once online. 3' For a company that had been gaining popularity by word-ofmouth and that had held itself out as the user-friendly alternative, such hardware problems could have been deadly. 32 Fortunately for AOL, Steve Case repeatedly apologized
33
to subscribers and then delivered on promises to solve AOL's technical difficulties.
Although impressed by these successes, market analysts continued to forecast
gloomy skies for AOL.34 Many suggested that new entrants to the online service market
would either "blow[] away" AOL35 or take it over.36 Simultaneously, AOL's traditional
competitors continued their practice of copying AOL's user-friendly features in an attempt to match AOL's growth. 37 Even in the face of these challenges however, AOL,
and Steve Case especially, retained a humble optimism about the company's vision and
future.38 And, over the next few years, AOL's
subscriber base grew almost exponen39
tially, pushing the company into first place.
AOL still faced two more significant obstacles, however. From the very beginning, a
substantial attraction of the online service companies had been the ease of using such
systems compared with linking directly to and maneuvering within the Internet. With
the invention of hypertext and the World Wide Web ("Web") 40 and the popularization of
Number 1 is better." Id.
31. See Dresser, supra note 11 ("America Online's smooth-running system began to go haywire,
abruptly bounding users off the network, or taking agonizing minutes to post a message in a supposedly realtime chat. Signing on during peak evening hours became an hourlong ordeal."); No. 3 America Online
Shooting for No. I Computer Service Is Trying to be "Younger, Smarter" Than Competitors, supra note 13
("Recent growth has not come painlessly.").
32. See Dresser, supra note 11 (quoting a PC Magazine editor's suggestion that "If they [AOL] don't
clean up their act very quickly, they will.., become a laughingstock.").
33. See Harmon, supra note 13.
34. See, e.g., Lohr, supra note 13 ("Yet Mr. Case and his company now find themselves facing
challenges as never before.... Today, as the frontrunner in the online industry, America Online must fend off
threats to its fast-growing business-from the rapid growth of the Internet, powerful new corporate rivals,
even experts questioning its accounting.").
35. Dresser, supra note 11 (quoting analyst Joshua Harris that "America Online is in danger of being
'blown away' when some powerful new competitors enter the market later this year. They include Ziff
Communications, publisher of PC World and other magazines, Rupert Murdoch's Delphi, the software giant
Microsoft Corp., and AT&T."); see also Southerland, supranote 27 ("[Plowerful companies such as Microsoft
Corp. are expected to eventually enter the commercial online market.").
36. See Southerland, supra note 27 ("One possible result is that America Online could become the target
of a takeover.").
37. See id. ("On another front, Prodigy is taking steps to halt some of its losses to AOL. It is expected to
launch some new features in coming weeks."); see also Lohr, supra note 13 (noting that "America Online's
traditional rivals.., have given their services facelifts or new management or both" to compete with AOL).
38. In particular Case remarked that "a new medium is emerging. It's an interactive medium in which
the key driver will be participation." Dresser, supra note 11. Case foresaw "a time.., when a computer
online service is almost as much of a fixture in the U.S. home as the television and telephone." Id. As for his
company's place in this new medium, he commented only that "The investment debate comes down to two
different views of the future. One view is that we're a leader in an exciting new field, and we could become
another Wal-Mart, Home Depot or even a Microsoft. The other is that we're a very fragile franchise about to
be battered by competition from Microsoft and the Internet. We'll see." Lohr, supranote 13.
39. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11 (detailing AOL's passing subscriber milestones of one million in
1994, three million in 1995, and seven million in 1996); Lohr, supra note 13 (labeling AOL "the nation's
leading online computer service in1995). While AOL has controlled its own growth in most countries, AOL
has also utilized joint ventures to expand into certain international markets. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11
(contrasting the autonomous creation of AOL UK, AOL Canada, and AOL France with AOL's cooperation
with Bertelsmann AG in launching AOL Germany and with Nikkei and Mitsui in launching AOL Japan).
40. For more detail on the history and technology of hypertext and the World Wide Web, see supra note

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 26:377

browser software,4 1 however, the simplicity advantage of the online service companies
seemed to evaporate and many predicted that as a result, online service subscribers
would defect from their contracts.42 Having fought for almost a decade to establish its
huge ranks of subscribers, AOL now faced the question of how to approach Web access.
In response, in late 1996 Case brought new executives into- the company, including
Robert Pittman, the man who had branded such successful businesses as the Music
Television Networks ("MTV"), Six Flags Theme Parks, and Time Warner Enterprises.43
With this new staff in place, AOL began to redefine itself. Rather than the home of an
interactive electronic community, AOL now billed itself as a tool of convenience, a
place from which users unfamiliar with the Web could launch themselves and then to
which users could safely and easily return.44 To further facilitate this transformation,
AOL unveiled a new "flat-rate" pricing scheme in December
of 1996, designed to en 7
45
courage AOL subscribers to use the Web without penalty.
The new pricing scheme was an instant success, but one which came at a tremendous
cost: because AOL had not enhanced its capacity enough in anticipation of the flat-rate
switchover, AOL subscribers completely overwhelmed AOL's telephone system, leaving millions of customers unable to access the service.46 As a result of these problems
and its restructuring, AOL posted huge fiscal losses in early 1997,47 and even found
itself the target of potential lawsuits over the delays.48 As in 1993, however, Steve Case
and AOL acted quickly to fix the technical problems and appease customer opinions.
The company committed $350 million to increase the capacity of its system, and distributed another thirty million dollars in suit settlements and user refunds.49 During the
41. The first web browser was developed in 1993 by Marc Andreessen, then a 22-year-old graduate
student at the University of Illinois. See Coats, supra note 15; Peniston & Bachmann, supra note 15. Called
"Mosaic," this software allowed users to easily navigate through the hypertext links of the Web, and was seen
as the critical tool in allowing public access to usher in the Internet revolution. See Coats, supra note 15;
Peniston & Bachmann, supra note 15. After creating Mosaic, Andreesson and several of his colleagues moved
to California and teamed with Jim Clark, the former head of Silicon Graphics, Incorporated. See Coats, supra
note 15; Peniston & Bachmann, supra note 15. With Clark's financial backing, Andreesson and his team
developed the "Netscape Navigator" browser, which they gave away online. See Coats, supra note 15;
Peniston & Bachmann, supra note 15. This marketing strategy caused Netscape to be the most prominently
used browser in the market-by the end of 1995, Netscape's browser was used in almost 80% of the
computers that had Web access. See Coats, supra note 15. After fighting off challenges from startup
companies like itself, however, Netscape then faced increased 'competition from the likes of Sun
Microsystems, creators of "Java," an extension of and improvement to html, and Microsoft, whose Internet
Explorer browser became included with the Windows operating system and resulted in the now-famous
antitrust litigation against Microsoft. See id.; see also e.g., James Grimaldi, Microsoft Response: Don't Kill
Success; Company Offers Alternatives to Breakup Plan, WASH. POST, May 11, 2000, at Al (describing the
most recent details of the Microsoft litigation, i.e. the company's reaction to the breakup plan proposed by the
Department of Justice).
42. See Harmon, supra note 13 ("With the birth of the World Wide Web, industry pundits again
predicted the end for proprietary services like America Online."); Lohr, supra note 13 (noting that "[a]s the
Internet becomes easier to use" for "consumers equipped with more powerful computers, modems and
specialized browsing software," it threatens "online services like America Online, whose appeal to many
subscribers has been as a hand-holding middleman making 'Net technology less forbidding").
43. See id.; see also AOL: Who We Are: Bob Pittman (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://corp.aol.com/
whoswho.html#Pittman> (describing Mr. Pittman's hiring and responsibilities at AOL).
44. See Harmon, supra note 13.
45. See id.; AOL Timeline, supra note 11.
46. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, AOL Has $155 Million Loss, but ForecastsSpring Rebirth, WASH. POST,
Feb. 7, 1997, at GI; Harmon, supra note 13.
47. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 46 (detailing AOL's approximately $155 million second quarter
loss).
48. See, e.g., Howard Wolinsky, AOL Says "Gridlock" Is Over, CHI. SUN-TiMEs, June 13, 1997, at Fin.
37 (noting that AOL agreed to terms "[t]o avoid being sued by the attorneys general of 36 states").
49. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 46; Jon Swartz, Beefed-Up AOL Says It's Ready to Grow: Online
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technical overhaul, AOL reduced advertising and distribution of its software, 50 and even
rented thousands of extra modems to ease the burden on subscribers until renovations
could be finished.51 While these steps did not sooth everyone,52 by the
summer of 1998
53
most analysts agreed that AOL had "turned the comer" on the crisis.
With these technical problems behind them, AOL pressed on and by late 1997 had
almost recreated the tremendous subscriber growth rate it had experienced earlier in the
decade.54 Powered by invigorated shareholder confidence 5 and its ever-increasing subscriber base, AOL began to acquire5 6 and enter into strategic partnerships5 7 with other
computer industry heavyweights. Furthermore, AOL began to consolidate its competition-in particular it began acquisitions of former rivals CompuServe and Netscape in
1998.58 Taken together, these most recent moves have left AOL nearly alone in the
online service marke5 9 and, along with Microsoft, one of two major players in the web
Service MailingSoftware Disks Again, S.F. CHRON., June 5, 1997, at B I; Wolinsky, supra note 48.
50. See Swartz, supra note 49.
51. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 46.
52. See Swartz, supra note 49 (describing how some "flustered customers" referred to AOL as "America
Offline" and "AO Hell").
53. Wolinsky, supra note 48 (quoting Case about the crisis in June 1997); see also Chandrasekaran,
supra note 46 (quoting an equity analyst that AOL's tactics "won't fix everything for them, but it's a positive
step in the right direction"); Swartz, supra note 49 (quoting another analyst that "[t]he demand problem is
behind them").
54. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11 (detailing AOL's growth from seven million subscribers in 1996 to
ten million in 1997, then to 15 million in 1998, to 20 million in 1999, and finally to 22 million in March of

2000).
55. AOL split its stock two-for-one in March and November of 1998, and was added to the Standard &
Poor's S&P 500 Index in December. See id.
56. Since its move to flat-rate pricing in December of 1996, AOL has purchased at least 13 companies.
See id. Beyond acquiring its rivals CompuServe and Netscape, AOL has also gained control of the leading
Internet music companies (Spinner.com, Winamp, and SHOUTcast), the biggest online marketing company
(Digital Marketing Services, Inc.), the leading movie listing/ticketing service (MovieFone, Inc.), and one of
the most popular online communications portals (Mirabilis Ltd., whose ICQ portal offered email and real-time

chat capability through its Instant Messenger service). See id.; AOL- Who We Are (visited Apr. 9, 2000)
<http:llcorp.aol.coml whoweare.html?>.
57. Although AOL has engaged in numerous partnerships and joint ventures in its history, some recent
pairings are particularly worthy of note. First, AOL has aligned itself with Gateway, Incorporated, the United
States' second-leading direct marketer of computers. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11; Hoover's Online:
Gateway, Inc.: Capsule (visited Apr: 9, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.comlco/capsule/6/0,2163,16706,00.html>.
Next, AOL has partnered with Motorola in an attempt to create a wireless version of AOL's Instant Messenger
service. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11. Furthermore, AOL and 3Com Corp. have strategically partnered to
give AOL users access to email via handheld computers. See id. Finally, AOL has signed agreements with
DirecTV, Incorporated, and others to meld television and computer interactivity. See id. This last set of
agreements is especially troublesome when one considers that DirecTV, the leading direct satellite television
provider, is a direct competitor of Time Warner's cable systems. See AOL-Time Warner Merger: Hearings
Before the Senate Jud. Comm. (2000), available in 2000 WL 227878 [hereinafter Hearings] at *9 (statement
of Sen. Herbert Kohl); Hoover's Online: DirecTV, Inc.: Capsule (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.
com/co/capsule/ 5/0,2163,47725,00.html>; see also infra Part H.B.5.
For an even more extensive list of those with whom AOL does substantial business, in and outside of the
computer industry, see AOL: Who We Are: Our Partners (visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://corp.aol.conV
partners.html>.
58. See id. AOL completed the CompuServe acquisition in 1998 and the Netscape acquisition in early
1999. See id. As part of the Netscape deal, Marc Andreessen, the creative mind behind Mosaic and the
Netscape Navigator became AOL's Chief Technology Officer. See id.
59. In terms of subseribership, AOL has now far outpaced all of the other online service companies.
While Prodigy remains in the industry with just over a million subscribers, see Hoover's Online: Prodigy
Communications Corp.: Capsule (visited Apr. 12, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.comco/capsule/3/
0,2163,42473,00.html>, other companies have now become AOL's primary, albeit distant, rivals. See, e.g.,
Matt Richtel, Two Providers of Net Access Set to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at C6 (discussing the
merger of Earthlink Network, Incorporated and Mindspring Enterprises, Incorporated that "create[d] a
company with 2.8 million subscribers" which is now "the clear but distant second-place service provider in the
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browser industry. Thus, while new challenges will certainly arise,60 AOL's stature,
combined with its strong management, history of overcoming adversity, and huge subscriber base, make it one of the most powerful companies in the one of the fastest
growing industries in America.
B. Time Warner
Time Warner, Incorporated ("Time Warner"), headed by its chairman Gerald Levin,
is one of several massive media conglomerates that have been formed in recent years,
along with Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation Limited ("News Corp."),6 the Walt
Disney Company ("Disney"), 62 Bertelsmann AG ("Bertelsmann"), 63 Viacom, Incorporated ("Viacom"), 64 the Sony Corporation ("Sony"), 65 and most recently, Dreamworks
SKG ("Dreamworks"). 66 Like the others, Time Warner is a complex collection of diUnited States behind America Online").
However, smaller Internet service providers ("ISPs") have sprung up in tremendous numbers, and many of
these are pursuing novel approaches to the market. See id. (noting that "more than 5,000" ISPs currently exist
in the United States and Canada). See id.
60. In particular, the greatest challenge facing AOL in the future may be technological. While AOL has
remained a "dial-up" service, whose customers must use phone lines to log in, cable modems and digital
subscriber lines ("DSLs") now offer "high-speed" access, in which greater amounts of information can be
transferred at a faster rate. See id. Although these two alternatives may pose a more significant threat in the
coming years, however, right now "the real competition among service providers.. . is to add subscribers," a
skill at which AOL has proved especially aaept. Id. Furthermore, the proposed merger with Time Warner
would remove or at least substantially alleviate this concern, as Time Warner has the second largest collection
of DSLs in the country. See infra Part U.B.5.
61. An Australian company, News Corp. is run by billionaire Rupert Murdoch, the company's chairman
and chief executive officer. See News Corporation:Board of Directors (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://www.
newscorp.com/ public/pressdir/indexl .html>. While News Corp. owns its vast publishing interests, see infra
Part II.B.1, sports teams (Los Angeles Dodgers, Australian National Rugby League), and an airline (Ansett), it
also owns 83% of the Fox Entertainment Group, which operates television and cable networks, see infra
Part ll.B.4, as well as movie and television production companies. See infra Part II.B.2; News Corporation:
Fox Entertainment Group (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/public/ irfox/>; News
Corporation Homepage (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/>.
62. Disney has become far more than the animation studio and theme parks established by creator Walt
Disney. In addition to those properties, Disney is now a leader in the feature film, television, and music
industries. See Walt Disney Company 1999 Annual Report (visited Apr. 20, 200.0) <http://disney.go.com/
investors/annual99/>.
63. Although most Americans may not recognize the Bertelsmann name, the German media
conglomerate has positioned itself just behind Time Warner and Disney with its holdings in publishing, music,
and European television. See Hoover's Online: Bertelsmann AG: Capsule (visited Apr. 25, 2000)
<http://www.hoovers.com/ co/capsule/l/0,2163,40661,00.html>.
64. Viacom has gradually amassed tremendous assets in the publishing, television, cable, and movie
industries, but also owns the leading video rental chain (Blockbuster) and a chain of theme parks (Six Flags).
See Hoover's Online: Viacom: Capsule (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/5/
0,2163,12435,00.html>; Viacom: Businesses (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <http://www.viacom.com/business.tin>.
65. Sony is a publicly-held Japanese firm which earned name recognition with its line of home
electronic equipment. While Sony is still the world's second largest seller of consumer electronics, a business
that accounted for approximately two-thirds of the company's $57 billion total revenues in 1999, Sony's
entertainment holdings have steadily grown. See Hoover's Online: Sony Corp.: Capsule (visited Apr. 16,
2000) <http://www.hoovers.comlco/capsule/5/0,2163,41885,00.html>.
Now, through several of its
subsidiaries, Sony has established itself as a force in the movie, television, music, and cable broadcasting
industries. See id.
66. Dreamworks was formed in 1994 as the brainchild of three entertainment moguls: director Steven
Spielberg, executive Jeffrey Katzenberg, and producer David Geffen. See Hoover's Online: Dreamworks
SKG: Capsule (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/0/0,2163,42800,00.html>. As the
youngest and still the smallest of the major media conglomerates, Dreamworks is currently only a player in the
music, movie and television production, and videogame industries. See id. However, it has been performing
well in those industries, with one billion dollars in sales in 1999, and its power is likely to grow as its three
founders continue to exert their influence. See id.
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verse media companies; however, the company has organized itself into five basic industry units. This Section will briefly describe those units and discuss the competition
Time Warner faces within each one.
1. Publishing
The oldest of Time Warner's companies is its publishing group, run by Time Incorporated ("Time"). 67 Although it began its publishing empire with the introduction of
Time Magazine in 1923,68 Time now publishes both magazines 69 and books, 70 and sells
its merchandise through book clubs 71 and direct marketing. 72 Accounting for approximately fifteen7percent of Time Warner's total business, Time had almost $4.5 billion in
sales in 1998. p
Each of Time's many magazine titles faces competition from rivals covering similar
75
topics 74 and, because new magazines are becoming more focused than ever before,
such "intra-niche" competition is likely on the rise.76 However, when one considers the
sum of Time's wide variety of titles, one can see that few companies rival Time's massive distribution and readership. One such firm is Advanced Publications, Incorporated

67. See About Time Warner.- Publishing (visited Feb. 27, 2000) <http:/lwww.timewarner.comcorpl
about/publishing/index.html>.
68. See id.
69. Time's 33 magazines span a wide range of topics, from news (Time, Life) to financial information
(Fortune, Money, Mutual Funds), to sports (Sports Illustrated (SI), SI for Women, SI for Kids), to
entertainment (Entertainment Weekly, People, Teen People, In Style), to family and personal issues (Health,
Parenting,Family Life). See About Time Warner: Publishing: Time, Inc.: Businesses (visited Feb. 27, 2000)
<http://www.timewarner.com/corp/about/publishing/timeinc/compbrandprod.html>.
Time's webpage boasts
that its magazines, which reach 120 million readers, accounted for roughly 21% of 1998's publishing
advertising revenues, and that it "is the only company to publish four national weekly consumer magazinesTime, People, Sports Illustrated and Entertainment Weekly." About Time Warner: Publishing: Time, Inc.
(visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.com/corp/about/ publishing/timeinc/index.html>.
70Time operates several publishing companies, including: Little, Brown & Company, Warner Books,
Time Life, Sunset Books, Oxmoor House, and Leisure Arts. See About Time Warner: Publishing: Time, Inc.:
Businesses, supra note 69. Together, these companies placed 31 titles onto 1998's New York Times best
seller list. See About Time Warner: Publishing,supra note 67.
71. For example, Time Warner operates the popular Book-of-the-Month Club, as well as other smaller
book clubs. See About Time Warner: Publishing: Time, Inc.: Businesses, supra note 69.
72. Time Life, Time Warner's direct marketing arm, sells books, videos, and music products. See About
Time Warner: Publishing: Time, Inc.: Overview (visited Feb. 27, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.com/corp/
aboutl/publishing/timeinc/about.htmil>;
Time
Life
Home
Page (visited
Mar.
21,
2000)
<http://www.timelife.com/>.
73. See Hoover's Online: Time Inc. Capsule (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/
capsule/1/0,2163,43661,00.html>.
74. For example, Time Magazine's chief rival among weekly news magazines is Newsweek. See
Hoover's Online: Washington Post, Inc.: Capsule (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/col
capsule/4/ 0,2163,12444,00.html>.
75. See William Glanz, Number of New Magazines Rises as Publications Cater to Niche Markets,
WASH. TIMES MAG., July 6, 1999. The total number of magazines published in the United States more than
doubled from 1985 (2,500 titles) to 1998 (5,500 titles), largely due to the increase in so-called "niche
magazines" which focus on narrow issues. See id.
76. Despite the increase in the number of total magazine titles available, overall consumer readership
has remained constant. See id. While this has left traditional titles fighting to keep hold of their readers, the
effects on top sellers are not yet clear; some traditionally popular magazines have lost business-Family
Circle's sales fell almost 10% between 1997 and 1998-while others, such as Time, have actually increased
readership and revenues. See id. Complicating matters is the low survivorship of new magazines. Although
on average three new titles debuted per day in 1998, some analysts suggest that only half of new titles survive
their first year, and only three of 10 remain four years after introduction. See id. Although these trends make
the future of individual magazines difficult to predict, Time as a Whole is likely insulated from these effects
because of its size, breadth of titles, and the ability to release its own niche magazines. For example, one of
the top niche debuts in 1998 was Teen People, a Time publication. See id.

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 26:377

("Advanced"), which sold $100 million worth of its magazines 77 in 1998.78 Similarly,
79
the Washington Post Company ("Washington Post"), with $2.2 billion in 1999 sales,
and The McGraw-Hill Companies, Incorporated ("McGraw-Hill"), with almost $4 billion, 80 each produce magazines that directly compete with Time titles. However, because Washington Post and McGraw-Hill each produce only one major magazine, the
majority of those companies' revenues are derived from their other industries.
In addition to Advanced, Washington Post, and McGraw-Hill, companies for whom
publishing is a primary or exclusive industry, Time also faces magazine competition
from three media conglomerates. First and foremost among these is Bertelsmann which,
producing eighty magazine titles and ten newspapers, is an even more powerful publishing force than Time itself.81 Furthermore, News Corp. 82 and Disney 83 should be considered major players in the industry because, while the two companies currently have

77. Advanced publishes magazines through its subsidiary Condd Nast. See Hoover's Online: Advanced
Publications, Inc. Capsule (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/6/0,2163,40006,00.
html>. Like Time, Condd Nast's 17 titles cover a wide range of material, from men's (GQ) and women's
magazines (Vogue, Mademoiselle, Allure, Women's Sports & Fitness) to cooking (Gourmet, Bon Appgtit),
computers (Wired), and society living (ArchitecturalDigest, The New Yorker). See Cond4 Nast Publications'
(visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.condenet.com/ subslmainmagpage.html>.
78. See Hoover's Online: CondJ Nast Publications,Inc. Capsule (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.
hoovers.com/co/capsule/6/0,2163,57226,00.html>. In addition to its magazine titles, Advanced publishes
daily newspapers in 22 cities, local business journals in another 40 cities, and has a minority interest in
Discovery Communications, Inc., the company behind cable networks such as the Discovery Channel and
Animal Planet. See id.; see also Hoover's Online: Discover Communications, Inc. Capsule (visited Mar. 8,
2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/ capsule/l/0,2163,43731,00.html>.
79. See Hoover's Online: Washington Post, Inc.: Capsule, supra note 74. Note that Newsweek and its
various foreign language translations are Washington Post's only mass-market magazine publications. See
The Washington Post Company: Magazines (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.washpostco.com/mag.htm>.
80. See Hoover's Online: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.: Capsule (visited Mar. 21 2000) <http:/l
www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/6/ 0,2163,10976,00.html >. Although McGraw-Hill produces several trade
magazines, its only mass-market publication is Business Week. See The McGraw-Hill Companies: Our
Businesses: Information & Media Services (visited Mar. 21 2000) <http://www.mcgraw-hill.com/businesses/
infomedia/index.html>.
81. See Gruner + JahrAG: Produkte (visited Mar. 22 2000) <http://www.guj.de/produkte/index.html>.
Bertelsmann owns 75% of Gruner + Jahr AG, its publishing arm. See Hoover's Online: Gruner+ JahrAG &
Co.: Capsule (visited Mar. 22 2000) <http://www.hoovers.comlco/capsule/3/0,2163,58233,00.html>. While
many of Gruner + Jahr's magazine titles and all of its newspapers are European, it does publish several
magazines that are popular in the United States, including Cosmopolitan, Fitness,marie claire,McCall's, and
National Geographic. See Gruner + JahrAG: Produkte (visited Mar. 22 2000) <http:llwww.guj.de/produktel
index.html>.
82. News Corp. has vast media holdings, but publishes only a few magazines. Primary among these are
TV Guide and The Weekly Standard. TV Guide, published since 1953, has become the largest selling
magazine in the United States, with a readership of 35 million people. See TV Guide Inc.: Products: TV Guide
The Weekly Standard,
Magazine (visited Mar. 20 2000) <http://www.tvguideinc.com/tvgmagframe.asp>.
focusing on politics and government, has drawn major attention and acclaim despite only being five years old
because of the notable journalists it has procured, such as William Kristol, Fred Barnes, and Brit Hume. See
generally, The Weekly Standard (visited Mar. 20 2000) <http://www.weeklystandard.com/>.
83. Disney publishes magazines of its own, primarily aimed at children, such as Disney Magazine and
Disney Adventures Magazine. See Disney Homepage (visited Mar. 20 2000) <http://disney.go.com/home/
homepage/ index.html?clk=1004398>. In addition, Disney subsidiaries also publish magazine titles. For
example, Disney's television network, ABC, Inc. ("ABC"), owns ESPN, the cable sports network that
publishes ESPN The Magazine. Also, ABC created A&E, the arts and entertainment cable network, as a joint
venture with NBC and Hearst Publishing; A&E now publishes Biography: The Magazine, based on A&E's hit
show Biography. See A&E: Shop A&E (visited Mar. 22 2000) <http://store.aetv.com/ cgi-binae.storefront/
0/Ext/OutsideFramefUT/32/ IntroPagelUT/l>. Finally, one of Disney's film companies, Miramax, just
expanded into magazine publishing in 1999 with Talk magazine, a joint venture with the Hearst Corporation.
See Walt Disney Company 1999 Annual Report, supra note 62.
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limited magazine holdings, their overall power allows them to leverage themselves media markets.84
Time faces a slightly different kind of competitive pressure in the book publishing
arena. Time has embraced a generalist strategy, utilizing its several publishing houses
to cover a wide range of popular authors and subjects.8 5 As such, it faces primary competition from other wide spectrum publishers, which are also owned and controlled by
some of the other media conglomerates: Random House, Incorporated (owned by
Bertelsmann),86 Simon & Schuster, Incorporated (part of the Viacom conglomerate),87
HarperCollins Publishers, Incorporated (owned by News Corp),88 and Hyperion Books
(owned by Disney). 89 Two other major publishers, Pearson, PLC 90 and McGraw-Hill, 91
could also be considered secondary competitors of Time, but their more-specialized
ranges of books only partially overlap with Time's product line.
2. Filmed Entertainment
Time Warner's filmed entertainment group consists of two 9 2 basic companies: Warner Brothers 93 and New Line Cinema ("New Line").94 While New Line is a "tradi84. Such maneuvering has already taken place. As one example, consider ESPN the Magazine,
published by Disney. See supra note 83. While ESPN had been the foremost cable sports network for many
years, once it was acquired by Disney, ESPN had the resources to expand its businesses tremendously. In
addition to adding more channels (ESPN2, ESPNews, ESPN Classic) and a chain of theme restaurants ("ESPN
Zones," located in five cities), ESPN launched ESPN the Magazine, a biweekly sports magazine, in 1998
which can directly compete with Time's Sports Illustrated. See generally ESPN Homepage (visited Apr. 23,
2000) <http://espn.go.com/> (describing ESPN's range of channels and restaurants); Walt Disney Company
1999 Annual Report, supra note 62 (noting ESPN the Magazine's near tripling of its circulation since its
founding).
85. This variety is fully displayed on the website Time has established to represent its book publishers.
See Time Warner Bookmark: Subject and Sites (visited Mar. 21 2000) <http://www.twbookmark.com/
subjectandsites/index.html> (providing the consumer with 12 broad categories from which to choose,
including art, business, fiction, non-fiction, health and beauty, children's books, mystery, romance, and
science fiction).
86. Random House provides a similarly wide array of book choices. See Books @ Random: Subject
Areas (visited Mar. 22 2000) <http://www.randomhouse.com/books/subjects/>. Random House claims to be
"the world's largest English-language trade book publisher," Books @ Random: About Random House (visited
Mar. 22 2000) <http://www.randomhouse.comibackyard/>.
87. See Simon & Schuster Homepage (visited Mar. 23 2000) <http://www.simonandschuster.com>
(displaying choices similar to those of Time and Random House's websites).
88. See HarperCollinsHomepage (visited Mar. 22 2000) <http://www.harpercollins.com/> (providing a
similar range of consumer choice for books).
89. See Hyperion Books Homepage (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://hyperion.go.com/>. Disney created
its trade publisher Hyperion in 1991. See id. As such, Hyperion has a smaller range of authors and books than
most of the other conglomerate book publishers, which had been independent companies prior to their
acquisition by the conglomerates. See id. Beyond Hyperion, which publishes books for adults, Disney also
claims to be "the number one publisher of children's books" worldwide.
90. Pearson publishes primarily educational texts via its Prentice Hall, Scott Foresman, Penguin Group
labels. See Pearson PLC: What We Make (visited Mar. 22 2000) <http://www.pearson.com/productsindex.
html>.
91. McGraw-Hill specializes in both educational publishing, for use in elementary, secondary, and
postsecondary settings, and professional publishing, for science, engineering, and medicine. See The
McGraw-Hill Companies: Our Businesses: Educational & Professional Publishing (visited Mar. 21 2000)
<http://www.mcgraw-hill.com/ businessesleppg/index.html>.
92. It should be noted there that, although New Line and Warner Brothers are the only companies
formally subsumed under the filmed entertainment group heading, all of Time Warner's cable networks
produce some proportion of their own programming, including weekly series, features, or special events. See
infra Part II.B.4.
93. Warner Brothers, along with Home Box Office and Time Warner's cable system holdings are
actually owned by the Time Warner Entertainment Company, a limited partnership of which Time Warner
owns 74.49%. See About Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment: Warner Brothers (visited Mar. 7 2000)
<http://www.timewarner.comlcorp/ about/entertainment/ warnerbros/index.html >; see also infra note 154 and
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tional" film production company,95 Time Warner proclaims that Warner Brothers "has
evolved into a fully integrated global entertainment company."9 6 As a result of this
evolution, Warner Brothers not only makes new movies 97 and television shows, 9 8 but
also publishes comic books99 and a magazine, 100 operates a chain of mall stores °1 and its
own broadcast television network,10 2 and markets and licenses its vast catalog of movie,
television, and cartoon titles.'0 3
In terms of feature films, Warner Brothers and New Line face competition from a
number of production companies. In terms of 1999 market share percentages, these
accompanying text.
94. See About Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment (visited Feb. 27, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.
com/corp/about/ entertainment/index.html>.
95. Created in 1967, New Line is made up of several divisions, each dedicated to one area of the film
industry (e.g. Cinema, Features, Home Video, International, New Media, Television, Licensing,
Merchandising). See About Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment:New Line Cinema (visited Mar. 7, 2000)
<http://www.timewarner.com/corp/about entertainment/newline/index.html>.
Although it began as a
company designed to distribute independent and foreign films, New Line has embraced its role as a "younger"
complement to Warner Brothers, and now produces its own features. About Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment, supra note 94.
96. About Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment,supranote 94.
97. In fact, Warner Brothers has three subdivisions that produce new films: Warner Brothers Pictures,
Warner Brothers Feature Animation, and Castle Rock Entertainment (obtained in Warner Brothers' 1996
acquisition of Turner Broadcasting). See About Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment: Warner Bros.:
Businesses (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.com/corp/about/entertainmentlwarnerbros
compbrandprod.html>.
98. Five of Warner Brothers' other subdivisions produce a wide range of television programming.
Whereas Warner Brothers Television Animation controls the Looney Toons and Hanna-Barbera catalog of
cartoon shorts, see id., Warner Brothers Television is responsible for many of the highest-rated primetime
network comedies and dramas, such as ER, Friends, The Drew Carey Show, and The West Wing. See About
Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment: Warner Bros.: Selected Brands & Products (visited Mar. 7, 2000)
<http://www.timewarner.comlcorp/about/ entertainment/warnerbros/selected.html>. Telepictures Productions
produces daytime variety and talk shows, including Change of Heart, EXTRA, Jenny Jones, and The Rosie
O'Donnell Show. See id. Finally, Warner Brothers Animation produces cartoons, such as Batman and
Superman, for the WB Network. See id.
99. DC Comics, home of some of the oldest comic book heroes such as Batman, Superman, and Wonder
Woman, is owned and controlled by Warner Brothers. See id. Collectively, DC Comics publishes 48 different
comic book titles on a monthly basis. See DC Comics: Get Comics (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http:l/www.
dccomics.com/>.
100. Warner Brothers publishes the humorous MAD Magazine, which spoofs a wide range of topics. See
About Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment: Warner Bros.: Businesses,supra note 97.
101. Warner Brothers Studio Stores, which sell clothing and merchandise related to Warner Brothers'
products, are fixtures in malls across the country and internationally. See About Time Warner: Filmed
Entertainment: Warner Bros.: Businesses, supra note 97; see also Warner Brothers Store Listings (visited
Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.wbstore.com/storewss.store.list.asp> (listing 135 locations in the United States
alone).
102. The Warner Brothers Network, also known as the "WB," began broadcasting in January of 1995,
and is now one of six major broadcast television networks. See Bill Carter, Big TV Networks in Turmoil as the
New Season Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at D1; Ultimate TV .Nets/Stations (visited Apr. 10, 2000)
<http:llwww.UltimateTV.com/tvluslnetworksl>; see also The WB Network Homepage (visited Apr. 16, 2000)
<http://www.thewb.com/>.
103. While Time Warner has historically retained the rights to its own catalog of films, television shows,
and cartoons, this is just a portion of the vast library Time Warner has now amassed, which includes
approximately 5,700 feature films, 32,500 television titles, and 13,500 animated titles. See About Time
Warner: Filmed Entertainment:Warner Bros., supra note 93. The key to assembling this large collection was
Time Warner's purchase of Ted Turner's Turner Broadcasting in 1996-Turner had previously bought both
the MGM library of films and Hanna-Barbera library of cartoons to fuel his cable networks. See About Time
Warner: Executives: R.E. Turner (visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http:l/www.timewarner.comlcorp/aboutl
timewarnerinc/corporatelexec-turner.html>. As a result of the merger, Turner was made a vice-chairman of
Time Warner and a member of its board of directors, while Turner's businesses were spun into various parts of
the Time Warner empire. See id.; see also infra Part II.B.4.
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companies fell into one of two basic categories-an "upper tier," in which firms each
garnered about ten percent or more of the total box office take, and a "lower tier," consisting of firms garnering less than five percent.' 4 All but one of the upper tier companies were owned by media conglomerates; among this more-powerful group, Warner
Brothers finished second, capturing 14.2% of market and trailing only Buena Vista, a
Disney company which led the industry with seventeen percent. 0 5 Also finishing in this
upper segment of the industry were: Universal Studios, Incorporated, the only upper tier
company not owned by a media conglomerate, 10 6 with 12.7%; Paramount Pictures, a
Viacom subsidiary with 11.6%; Twentieth Century Fox, part of Rupert Murdoch's News
Corp., which collected 10.8%; and Sony Pictures, with 8.6%.1° 7
The rest of the non-conglomerate film companies could be found in the lower stratum of the industry in 1999, along with the conglomerates' smaller subsidiaries that
produce independent, foreign, or lower budget movies. For example New Line, with a
market share of 4.2%, was virtually tied with Disney's subsidiary, the Miramax Film
Corporation, and two independent firms, Artisan Pictures, Incorporated, and MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Incorporated ("MGM"). 10 8 The only conglomerate to finish in0 9this
lower tier was Dreamworks, which finished the year with only 4.4% of the market.'
Warner Brothers stands similarly strong in terms of television production. While
there are numerous production companies generating television shows each year, many
are smaller and either specialize in one genre of shows 0 or have only one or two reliable hits."' Given that viewer tastes change" 2 and even "hit"' 3 shows typically retain
104. See Studio Scorecard,ENT. WKLY., Feb. 4, 2000, at 34-38.
105. See id. Buena Vista "devoured the competition," bringing in $1.24 billion with movies such as The
Sixth Sense, Toy Story 2, and The Insider, and by finishing first in overall box office sales for the fifth time in
six years. Id.
106. Ninety-two percent of Universal Studios is owned by the Canadian Seagram Company, Ltd.
("Seagram"). See Hoover's Online: Universal Studios, Inc.: Capsule (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.
hoovers.com/co/capsule/9/ 0,2163,43679,00.html>. While Seagram, a liquor company, is not typically
included among the major media conglomerates, it now actually receives a majority of its revenues from its
entertainment businesses. See Hoover's Online: Seagram Company Ltd.: Capsule (visited Apr. 10, 2000)
<http://www.hoovers.comlco/ capsulel//0,2163,41797,00.html>. In addition to Universal Studios, Seagram
also owns the Universal Music Group, see infra note 140, a percentage of the USA Cable Network, and about
one quarter of the Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corporation ("Loews"), the second largest movie theater
chain in the world. See id.; see also infra Part Il.B.3.
107. See Studio Scorecard, supra note 104. Sony creates films under its Columbia Pictures and Sony
Picture Classics labels and also owns 40% of the Loews theater chain. See Hoover's Online: Sony Corp.:
Capsule, supranote 65; see also supra note 106 (discussing Seagram's stake in Loews).
108. See id.
109. See id. The year began poorly for Dreamworks when its film Saving PrivateRyan lost the Academy
Award for best picture to Miramax's Shakespeare in Love. See id. However, that trend was reversed this year,
as Dreamworks' American Beauty captured the best picture award, possibly signaling a banner year for the
young company.
110. See, e.g., Bunim/Murray Productions Homepage (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.bunimmurray.com/> (offering information on company producing several "reality"-based shows, such as MTV's The
Real World); Wolf Creek Productions Homepage (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.wolfcreekinc.com/>
(producing shows about hunting, fishing, and the outdoors).
11.
For example, Wolf Films, Incorporated, generates two successful primetime shows, Law & Order
and Law & Order: Special Victims Unit. See Wolf Films Homepage (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.
wolffilms.com/>.
In addition, it should be noted that many of these smaller production companies are owned by writers who,
having experienced so much success, wanted to produce their shows as well as write scripts for them.
Examples of these companies include David E. Kelley Productions (The Practice,Ally McBeal) and Stephen
Bochco Productions (NYPD Blue).
112. Compare Sally Bedell, Forthe TV Networks, the Key to Success is a Long Story, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 1983, § 6 at 1 (pronouncing the "sudden revival" of the television miniseries genre by The Winds of War
in January 1983) with Allan Johnson, Miniseries Genre's Hour of Truth?, THE RECORD (Bergen County), Feb.
27, 2000, at Y4 (suggesting that the fate of the miniseries genre hung on the success or failure of the NBC
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their popularity only for short periods,' 14 most production companies face constant
challenges as the industry preferences fluctuate. By utilizing its different divisions to
generate vastly different kinds of shows, however, Warner Brothers can insulate itself
from such fluctuations, capitalizing on whatever genre is "hot" while simultaneously
garnering revenues with so-called "counterprogramming" from its other divisions.
15 Empowered by similar resources, the other conglomerates pursue similar strategies.

miniseries The l0th Kingdom in March 2000).
The fickle nature of viewers and the fact that genres wax and wane in popularity has been commented upon
even more frequently in recent months because of the dramatic success of the ABC show Who Wants to be a
Millionaire. See, e.g., Michael Schneider, Gameshows (and, Oh Yeah, Money) Make the World Go 'Round,
VARIETY, Jan. 17, 2000, at N6 (discussing game shows' transition in status from television's "bastard
stepchild" to a genre with "newfound respectability"); Bernard Weinraub, Sudden Explosion of Game Shows
Threatens the Old TV Staples; Costly Sitcoms and Dramas Scramblefor Space and Survival, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 2000, at El (suggesting that because of the proliferation of Millionaire and similar shows "the television
landscape has turned positively Darwinian for comedies and dramas"). While trends have always come and
gone, however, some suggest that the television landscape has now changed irreparably, leaving cable
networks to push the creative envelope while and broadcast networks fill as much time as possible with
cheaper game shows, talk shows, "reality" shows, and news magazine shows. See, e.g., Bill Carter, Cable
Television Ups the Ante on the Outrageous,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1999, at Cl ; Weinraub, supra.
113. For a discussion of how the term "hit" can be applied liberally in the television business, see Brian
Lowry, On TV, Is a Show a Hit Just Because They Say It Is?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at Fl.
114. See, e.g., Bill Carter, Why Cheers Proved So Intoxicating, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1993, § 2 at 31
(discussing the end of Cheers, NBC's longest running situation comedy, after 11 seasons); Lynn Elber, End of
LA. Law Era: the Series is Adjourned, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), at 3E (describing the death of NBC's drama
hit about lawyers after eight seasons); Breea Willingham, Murder, She Wrote: Television Losing Its Royalty,
NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro), May 19, 1996, at D1 (bemoaning the end of the CBS series which, after 11
seasons, was the longest-running detective drama ever).
115. As one example, consider Viacom. Viacom currently has a significant presence in the television
production industry-its Paramount Television division, which already produced a number of series (Frasier,
the Star Trek franchise of shows) and syndicated shows (Entertainment Tonight, Leeza, Montel Williams),
recently merged with famed producer Aaron Spelling's Spelling Television Group, Incorporated (Beverly Hills
90210, 7th Heaven), to increase its output. See Viacom: Businesses: Television: Paramount Television
(visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http://www.viacom.com/prodbyunitl.tin?ixBusUnit=17>. In addition, Viacom is in
the midst of acquiring the broadcast network CBS, which will greatly expand its role in the television industry.
While CBS purchases some of its programming from independent production companies (City of Angels,
Everybody Loves Raymond), the network also bolsters both its own and other networks' lineups with
programming generated by its divisions and subsidiaries. For instance, CBS's news division produces all of
CBS's news shows (60 Minutes, 48 Hours, CBS Evening News, Face the Nation), while King World
Productions, Incorporated, a CBS subsidiary, produces syndicated programming available to CBS and other
networks, including game shows (Hollywood Squares) and talk shows (Oprah, the Martin Short Show, the
Roseanne Show). See CBS News Homepage (visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http://cbsnews.cbs.com/>; King World
Homepage (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.kingworld.com/>.
Disney, owner of the ABC broadcast network, and News Corp., which owns the Fox network, both have
divisions that engage in similar practices as CBS's. See, e.g., Fox EntertainmentGroup Annual Report 1999:
Business Overview (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.newscorp.com/publicirfox/report99/Navigation/
foxsecnd.html> (discussing the "record-breaking" amount of programming generated by Twentieth Century
Fox Television); Walt Disney Company 1999 Annual Report, supra note 62 (describing Disney's Buena Vista
Television and ABC Entertainment Television Group and the shows those divisions produce). Furthermore,
there is evidence that the trend of networks producing their own programming is constantly increasing, which
concerns some media analysts. See Brian Lowry, The Fittest? Make That Survival of the Biggest, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2000, at F1 (noting that of ABC's 16 new primetime series in production, 14 are produced by
divisions of Disney).
As another example of conglomerate presence on television, consider Sony, which produces programming
through its Columbia TriStar Television subsidiary. See Hoover's Online: Sony Corp.: Capsule, supra note
65. Like Warner Brothers and Viacom, Sony generates a wide range of shows, including comedies (King of
Queens, NewsRadio), dramas (Dawson's Creek, Party of Five), game shows (Jeopardy, Wheel of Fortune),
talk shows (Donnie & Marie, Ricki Lake), cartoons (Godzilla, Men in Black), and soap operas (Days of Our
Lives, Young & the Restless). See Sony Pictures Entertainment: Columbia TriStar Television: Shows (visited
Apr. 16, 2000) <http:llwww.spe.sony.com/tv/showslindex.htni>.
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Only five years old, the WB Network is one of the youngest and smallest broadcast
television networks. 1 6 Although it has scheduled a complete prime time lineup and
daytime offerings such as talk shows and children's cartoons,1181 7 the WB has far fewer9
In terms of ratings"
affiliates carrying its programming than the major networks.
2
°
12 1
and CBS122 -but
NBC
then, the WB does not challenge the "Big Three"-ABC,

116. See supra note 102.
117. See supra note 98.
118. The WB is currently carried by 235 affiliates, of which 125 are cable-only. See The WB Homepage,
supra note 102. The remaining 115 broadcast affiliates are far fewer than the 200-plus boasted by ABC, CBS,
and NBC See ABC: Local Stations (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://abc.go.com/locaLstationst>; CBS: Local
News (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://cbsnews.cbs.com/now/change-city/frameset/l%2C%2C412%2C00.
shtml>; NBC: Local Stations (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.nbc.com/stations>.
119. Television "ratings" have been computed by Nielsen Media Research since the 1950s as "an
estimate of audience size and composition for television programmers and commercial advertisers." Nielsen
Media Research: Who We Are & What We Do (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.nielsenmedia.conV>.
Simply stated, Nielsen Media Research measures viewership by surveying over 5,000 homes in the United
States--the residents in those homes, who are chosen to represent a cross-section of American viewers,
volunteer to have their viewing habits monitored, and these data are converted to "ratings." See Nielsen Media
Research: What Do Ratings Really Mean (visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://www.nielsenmedia.com/>. Ratings
are reported as "points," where each point represents one percent of the estimated 99.4 million television
households in the United States; thus, a show receiving one ratings point was watched by 994,000 households.
See Ultimate TV: TV News & Ratings (visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://www.ultimatetv.com/news/nielsen/
networks/000410network.html>. Individual networks then use the ratings information to compute how much
to charge advertisers for commercials during their programming. See Nielsen Media Research: Who We Are
& What We Do, supra.
Viewership is surveyed in two different ways. First, special boxes are affixed to the television sets of
survey homes; these boxes monitor the programs that are watched daily. See, e.g., Bill Carter, Who Needs the
Sweeps? TV's Periodic Race for Ratings Seems to Have Lost Its Purpose, N.Y. TtMES, Apr. 24, 2000, at C1.
In addition, three times per year, in November, February, and May, viewers in survey homes are asked to keep
diaries regarding what they watch each week. See id. These "sweeps weeks" are especially important,
because information from the diaries yields demographic data-in other words, sweeps are the only times
when stations and advertisers can tell the age and income level of viewers. See id. Because sweeps are so
important, networks have begun scheduling their programming around the sweeps periods-sweeps now chew
up as many as 12 of the 20 to 25 new episodes of popular shows each season. See id. The resulting "'deep
valleys of repeats' right in the middle of the television season" have led to many complaints about the
"'antiquated' diary system, but there is little hope for change because "nobody has the money or will to
change it." Id. (quoting the executive vice president of research for CBS and the president of CBS Television,
respectively).
Understanding ratings can be difficult, given the fact that they are reported for each hourly time period,
every day, every week. See Ultimate TV: TV News & Ratings, supra. As such, one sees fluctuations over
days and weeks as networks attempt to solidify certain days while relinquishing others, special events distort
ratings during certain weeks, and so forth. See, e.g., Bernard Weinraub, CBS Takes a Gamble on a Blitz of
Falcone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2000, at El (suggesting how CBS planned to capitalize on its televising the
National Collegiate Athletic Association Men's Basketball tournament); Wendy Williams, Must See it to
Believe it-NBC Changes its Lineup to Protect Thursday Night, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 22, 2000, at Arts 57
(describing the loosening of NBC's traditional hold on Thursday nights after 17 years and how ABC and CBS
plan to capitalize upon it).
120. ABC, Incorporated, now part of the Disney conglomerate, is also heavily involved in television
production and radio, and owns pieces of two joint ventures, the A&E family of cable networks and Lifetime
Entertainment Services. See supra note 83; see also Hoover's Online: ABC, Inc.: Capsule (visited Apr. 23,
2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/ capsule/l/0,2163,47291,00.html>.
121. The National Broadcasting Company, commonly known as NBC, is now owned by General Electric.
Beyond being a broadcast network, NBC also operates two cable networks, CNBC and MSNBC, and owns
32% of Paxson Communications and 25% of the A&E family of cable networks. See supra notes 83, 120;
Hoover's Online: National Broadcasting Company, Inc.: Capsule (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.
hoovers.com/co/capsule/6/ 0,2163,47376,00.html>.
122. The CBS Corporation is about to be purchased by media conglomerate Viacom. See Hoover's
Online: CBS Corporation: Capsule (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/
6/0,2163,10256,00.html>. In addition to its broadcast network, CBS owns two cable stations and is heavily
involved in television production and radio. See id.; supra note 115.
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UPN, Viacom's young network also established in 1995,123
instead routinely battles with
124
and sometimes with Fox.
Warner Brother's extensive catalog of movies, television shows, and cartoons generates revenue for the company in several ways.125 While the other conglomerates have
also accumulated such libraries, it is difficult to determine the relative strength of each
company because not the conglomerates publish how large their libraries are 26and, even
if they do, one cannot tell how valuable a library is from mere numbers alone.
Even with its mall stores, Warner Brothers faces significant conglomerate competition; Disney has a similar line of stores dealing in the same kind of merchandise, such as
videos, clothing, and collectibles, 127 but has many more locations. 128 In fact, Warner
Brothers' only real refuge from conglomerate competition lies in the comic book business, where Warner Brothers' DC Comics is one of only two major
29 publishers in the
country, along with the Marvel Entertainment Group, Incorporated.
3. Music
As with its other industries, Time Warner does not focus solely on recording music,
but instead has gathered companies involved in every aspect of the music business under
its broad Warner Music Group ("Warner Music") heading. 30 This diversification allows Time Warner to exert influence and exact a profit at every point between the time
when a song is written and when it finally reaches its listener. To control songwriting
and licensing, Warner Music owns two music publishing companies: Warner/Chappell
123. Despite being founded the same year, UPN is currently carried by even fewer total affiliates, 179,
than the WB. See UPN Homepage (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.upn.com/>; see also Carter, supra
note 102.
124. As Fox discussed in its most recent annual report, "[w]hen the Fox Broadcasting Company was
created... [in 1988], few predicted that its popularity would soar." Fox EntertainmentGroup Annual Report
1999: Business Overview, supra note 115. However, despite continuing to finishing fourth in the overall
ratings, Fox has now moved into second place in terms of capturing the most valuable viewer demographic,
adults age 18 to 49. See id.
125. Warner Brothers can (1) sell the movies, shows, and cartoons directly to consumers on video tapes
or DVDs, (2) license rental chains to rent video tapes or DVDs to the public, and (3) license them to broadcast
or cable networks so they can be shown on television.
126. In terms of feature films, it is clear that Warner Brothers' catalog (5,700 titles) is larger than those
owned by Sony (3,500) and Viacom (2,500). Compare About Time Warner: Filmed Entertainment: Warner
Brothers, supra note 93, with Sony Pictures Entertainment: Corporate Information: Fact Sheet (visited Apr.
21, 2000) <http:/www.spe.sony.com/spe/corporate factsindex.html>, with Viacom: The Businesses: Motion
Pictures: Paramount Pictures (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http://www.viacom.com/prodbyunitl.tin?ix
BusUnit=15>. But, while Disney and Fox both allude to their catalogs, neither company lists its catalog's
size, making a true comparison impossible.
127. See, e.g., DisneyStore.com Homepage (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://store.disney.go.com/
1776&clk=
ObjectBuilder/ObjectBuilder.iwx?ProcessName=DSSectionPage&MerchantID=2&SectionID=
1006644> (displaying range of available merchandise).
128. As of March 1999, Disney had opened 700 stores in malls around the country, more than five times
as many as Warner Brothers. Compare Walt Disney Company 1999 Annual Report, supra note 62 (visited
Apr. 20, 2000) <http://disney.go.comlinvestors/annual99/>, with Warner Brothers Store Listings, supra note
101.
129. The Marvel Entertainment Group, home of Spiderman, the X-Men, and the Incredible Hulk,
publishes 24 monthly comic book titles. See Marvel.com: Subscribe to Marvel Comics (visited Apr. 10, 2000)
<http://www.marvel.com/direct/subscribe/subscribe-print.html>. While Marvel and DC have been consistent
rivals for years, DC just shocked the industry by hiring Stan Lee, the 77 year-old creator of most of Marvel's
characters. See Robert Thompson, Famed Comic CreatorQuits Marvel for Rival, NAT'L POST, Apr. 14, 2000,
at C3. Lee, who had spent almost 60 years with Marvel, had his contract voided in 1998 as part of Marvel's
bankruptcy proceedings. See id. Jenette Kahn, DC's president and editor-in-chief "expect[s that] the financial
upside... [of Lee's hiring] will be tremendous." Id.
130. See About Time Warner: Music (visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.com/corp/about/
music/wmg/index.html>.

2000]

AOL-Time WarnerMerger

Music, Incorporated ("Warner/Chappell") 3 1and Warner Brothers Publications, Incorporated.' 32 In the recording arena, Warner Music owns eight record labels outright1 33 and
has an interest in several other joint ventures. 134 Furthermore, under each of these recording labels, Warner Music maintains a stable of popular artists that span a range of
musical styles. 135 Once music is recorded, Warner Music then turns the product over to
its in-house media services firm, which is responsible for the reproduction and packaging of Time Warner merchandise.! 36 Finally, Warner Music
also has resources in music
137
distribution to ensure that its products reach its customers.
Competition within the music industry has fluctuated wildly over the years but, despite a tumultuous history, the industry has become increasingly concentrated in the past
decade or so. 138 As a result of this trend, five major companies, known collectively as
the "Big Five," now dominate the music marketplace. 39 Currently, the largest company
131. See Warner/ChappellMusic Homepage (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.warnerchappell.com/>.
In the 1920s, Warner Brothers purchased many of the premier music publishers in order to furnish music for
its films-while the company Warner Brothers erected to unite these publishers changed names several times,
it grew substantially over the next six decades. See Warner/ChappellMusic: About Us: Our History (visited
Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.warnerchappell.com/>. Over about the same time period, Chappell Music,
Incorporated grew into a publishing force that became Warner Brothers' main competitor. See Jerry F.
Sharell, Warner/Chappell:A Company Profile (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.warnerchappell.com/>. In
1987, these two companies merged to form Warner/Chappell, which is now a global music publisher
controlling over one million copyrights and many of the most popular songs and songwriters. See id.; About
Time Warner:Music, supra note 130.
132. Warner Brothers Publications, a subsidiary of Warner/Chappell, produces and distributes written
musical materials ranging from sheet music to instructional books. See Sharell, supra note 132.
133. In particular, Time Warner owns the Atlantic Recording Corporation ("Atlantic"), the Elektra
Entertainment Group, Incorporated, Reprise Records, the Rhino Entertainment Company, the Sire Records
Group, Warner Bros. Records, Incorporated, Warner Classics International, and Warner Music International.
See About Time Warner: Music: Businesses (visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.com/corp/
about/music/wmg/compbrandprod.html>; About Time Warner: Music: Websites (visited Apr. 16, 2000)
<http://www.timewarner.comlcorp/about/pubarchive/websites.html#wmg>.
134. In particular, Warner Music has stakes in several recording companies, such as 143 Records, Giant
Records, Maverick Recording Company, QWest Records, RuffNation Records, and Tommy Boy Music. See
About Time Warner: Music: Warner Music Group: Businesses (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.
timewarner.com/corp/about/music/wmg/compbrandprod.html>.
135. Unlike filmed entertainment, where Time Warner has utilized New Line and Warner Brothers to
target different markets within the film industry, see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text, each of the
Warner Music labels covers a broad scope of music. For example, Atlantic artists range from country western
(Tim McGraw, John Michael Montgomery) to popular (Brandi, Hootie & the Blowfish), from "soft" rock (Phil
Collins, Jewel) to "classic" rock (Led Zeppelin), and from alternative (Tracy Chapman, Sinead O'Connor) to
rap (Kid Rock). See About Time Warner: Music: Selected Brands & Products (visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http://
www.timewarner.com/ corp/about/music/wmg/selected.html>.
136. The Ivy Hill Corporation and Warner Media Services are divisions of WEA, Incorporated, a Time
Warner company. Together, these two divisions mass-produce Time Warner's compact and digital video
discs, and audio and video cassette tapes, as well as the artistic covers, liner notes, and packaging for all of
those products. See Ivy Hill Corporation/WarnerMedia Services Homepage (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://
www.ivyhill-wms.com/home.html>.
137. Warner Music sells its merchandise directly to the public in two basic ways. First, Warner Music
operates several online music stores, including CDNow, the Direct Audio Video Express (D.A.V.E.), and Earl. See About Time Warner: Music: Websites, supra note 133. In addition, Warner Music markets music
through the Columbia House Company ("Columbia House"), the "largest club-based direct marketer of
music... in North America." Hoover's Online: Columbia House Company: Capsule (visited Apr. 17, 2000)
<http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/6/0,2163,60526,00.html>. Columbia House, which sells to its members
via its monthly subscriber magazines and two websites, was started in 1955 but is now jointly owned by Time
Warner and Sony. See id.
138. See Brenda Bouw, Big Seven is Now Down to Four: 10 Years, Three Big Deals, NAT'L POST, Jan.
25, 2000, at C8. As Bouw discusses, although the early years of the music industry were dominated by CBS,
RCA, and Capitol, but by the end of the 1980s seven major companies ruled the market: Universal (then called
RCA), A&M, PolyGram, Warner Music, EMI, Sony, and BMG. See id.
139. PolyGram bought A&M in 1990, and then in 1997, Universal merged with PolyGram, reducing the
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among the "Big Five" is the Universal Music Group ("Universal Music"),' 4° followed
1 41
by Sony Music Entertainment, Incorporated
("Sony Music"),
the EMI Group PLC
144
143
("EMI"), 142 BMG Entertainment, and Warner Music.
Warner Music has a larger presence in the more-specialized music publishing industry, where Warner/Chappell is second only to EMI's publishing arm.145 Like Warner/Chappell, EMI deals with song rights worldwide, but EMI controls slightly more
copyrights than Warner/Chappell, and is the "world's largest music publisher in terms of
copyrights." 14 6 Together; though, Warner/Chappell and EMI's two million plus copy47
rights account for at least twenty percent of the publishing industry's total revenues.1
The company closest to EMI and Warner/Chappell
in terms of publishing is Universal
148
Music, which owns only 700,000 copyrights.
Complicating this situation are signs on the horizon indicating that the music industry as a whole may soon become even more concentrated: just after announcing its
merger with AOL, Warner Music announced plans to purchase half of EMI. 14 9 Given
"Big Seven" to the "Big Five." See id.
140. Universal Music led the industry with about 20% of the market in 1999. See Hoover's Online:
Universal Music Group: Capsule (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.coin/co/capsule7/
0,2163,100557,00.html>. In addition to its 20 recording labels and popular artists (Sheryl Crow, Elton John),
Universal Music has an extensive publishing business, and has now moved online with concerts and
downloads (through its Jimmy & Doug's Farm Club site) and sales (through GetMusic, a joint venture with
BMG Entertainment). See id.; infra note 148. Like Universal Studios, the Universal Music Group is owned
by Seagram, which is not typically considered a media conglomerate but may be on the verge of becoming
one. See supra note 106.
141. Sony Music finished second behind Universal thanks partly to the success of the movie Titanicsales of the movie's soundtrack and single contributed significantly to Sony Music's earnings. See Hoover's
Online: Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.: Capsule (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/
capsule/4/ 0,2163,56304,00.html>. Sony Music's recording labels include Columbia, Epic, and Nashville,
under which fall artists such as Mariah Carey, the Dixie Chicks, and Barbra Streisand. See Sony Music: Full
Artist List (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.sonymusic.com/artists/full.html>. In addition, Sony Music
owns half of Columbia House, its direct marketing joint venture with Warner Music. See Hoover's Online:
Sony Music Entertainment,Inc.: Capsule, supra; supra note 137.
142. EMI is one of the only major music companies not owned or controlled by a conglomerate, however
this independent status has led to constant speculation regarding potential takeovers and mergers. See
Hoover's Online: EMI Group, Inc.: Capsule (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/9/
0,2163,41769,00.html>. Like the other major music powers, EMI has several recording labels (Capitol,
Chrysalis, Virgin) and a stable of artists (Garth Brooks, Tina Turner); what sets EMI apart, however, is its topranked music publishing business. See id.
143. BMG Entertainment is owned by the German conglomerate Bertelsmann, and currently encompasses
200 recording labels (Arista, RCA), a music publishing arm, and disc and cassette manufacturing capability.
See Hoover's Online: BMG Entertainment: Capsule (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/
capsule/8/ 0,2163,58218,00.html>. In addition, BMG Entertainment owns and operates the BMG Music Club,
Columbia House's main competition in direct marketing, and has jointly created GetMusic, an online music
source, with the Universal Music Group. See id.
144. See Bouw, supra note 138 (chronicling industry's current rankings); Roger Smith, It's Only Money,
VARIETY, Mar. 20, 2000, at 3 (discussing events leading up to the proposed Warner-EMI merger). Warner
Music was the strongest music company in the 1980s, especially domestically, however management shakeups
and movement by the other members of the "Big Five" in the 1990s caused Warner Music's status to dip. See
id. Kept alive by Warner Chappell's growing profits, Warner Music reorganized its executives and now, as a
result of the AOL and EMI deals, seems poised to recapture its former position. See id.
145. See David Lieberman, Musical Merger Creates Royal Flush, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2000, at 3B.
146. EMI Group: Music Publishing (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.emigroup.com/publishing/i.html>. See also Hoover's Online: EMI Group Inc.: Capsule, supra note 142; Lieberman, supra note 145.
147. See Lieberman, supra note 145.
148. See Hoover's Online: Universal Music Group: Capsule, supra note 140; Universal Music Group:
About UMG (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.umusic.com/static/> (noting Universal Music's third place
position in the industry and its catalog of roughly 700,000 copyrights).
149. See id.; Andrew Pollack & Andrew Sorkin, Time Warner to Acquire Control of EMI Music, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan 24, 2000, at C1 (noting that "[p]eople familiar with the Warner-EMI deal... expect[ ] it to win
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150
the tremendous ramifications of this acquisition, especially in the publishing arena,
other members of the "Big Five" are now rumored
'1 5 1 to be negotiating mergers that could
further reduce the "Big Five" to the "Big Three."

4. Cable Networks
Time Warner subdivides its collection of cable networks into three basic clusters: the
152
TBS Entertainment group, the CNN News group, and the Home Box Office group.
While Time Warner owns the TBS and CNN groups outright due to its purchase of
Turner Broadcasting in 1996,151 it controls the Home Box
Office group through the
154
Time Warner Entertainment Company limited partnership.
The first cluster of networks, the TBS Entertainment group, encompasses ten cable
channels with varying degrees of specialization. 55 On the narrower side of this spectrum, the Cartoon Network targets primarily children,' 56 while Turner Classic Movies is
designed for nostalgic film buffs.157 In contrast, the other TBS Entertainment networks,
including Turner Network Television ("TNT"), 158 the Turner Broadcasting System Superstation ("TBS"), 59 and the new Turner South, 60 target broader audiences with a
antitrust approval in the United States and Europe," although "some analysts said that with the number of
companies shrinking, the antitrust scrutiny could grow more intense"); Smith, supra note 144.
150. As Lieberman discusses, while an EMI-Warner Music merger would form the largest music
company, the most significant implication of such a deal would be in the music publishing industry, where the
combination would be "'so huge that it [would] be pretty daunting' to rivals." Lieberman, supra note 145
(quoting editor of Music Business International). Because of Warner/Chappell and EMI's stature above the
rest of the publishing industry, the proposed merger could result in the combination controlling up to 45% of
the market. See id. This proposed market power becomes even more troublesome when one considers the
financial benefits that can be derived from publishing because "it costs so little to run, and big hits pay off
handsomely." Id. (detailing the various ways that publishing leads to high revenues with little corresponding
effort or cost).
151. See, e.g., Bouw, supra note 138 ("Industry insiders also believe that they [the "Big Five"] are only a
few one-hit wonders away from more consolidation... that could bring the number of record labels to
three."); Lisa Brownlee, Sony-BMG Would Be Music Leader, N.Y. POST, Jan. 31, 2000, at 38 (suggesting that
BMG and Sony were planning a merger, and noting that the heads of both companies were "under mounting
pressure" to move in response to the EMI-Warner Music announcement); Chuck Philips, BMG at Loss After
Rival's Merger Stole Its Thunder, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2000, at Cl (describing frustration within BMG caused
by the EMI-Warner Music announcement).
152. See About Time Warner: Cable Networks (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.com/
corp/about/cablenets/index.html>.
153. See supranote 103.
154. See About Time Warner: Cable Networks: Home Box Office (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.
timewarner.com/corp/about/cablenets/hbo/index.html>; see also supra note 93.
155. See About Time Warner: Cable Networks: TBS Entertainment (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.
timewarner.com/corp/about/cablenets/turnerent/index.html>.
156. Showing cartoons 24 hours per day, seven days per week, the Cartoon Network and its siblings,
Cartoon Network Europe, Cartoon Network Latin, and Cartoon Network Asia Pacific, rely heavily on the
Warner Brothers library of animated Looney Toons and Hanna-Barbera shorts. See Cartoon Network
Homepage (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.cartoonnetwork.com/>; About Time Warner: Cable Networks:
TBS Entertainment,supra note 155; see also supra note 103. In addition to these classic cartoons, however,
the various Cartoon Networks also televise newly produced animated features and shows. See Cartoon
Network Homepage, supra. Despite what would appear to be a limited audience, the Cartoon Network has
grown to the point that it can be seen in 85% of American cable-equipped homes, and was the third-highest
rated ad-supported cable network in 1999. See About Time Warner: Cable Networks: TBS Entertainment:
Overview (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.comlcorp/aboutlcablenets/turnerent/about.html>.
157. See Turner Classic Movies Homepage (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://tcm.turner.com/> (featuring
programming schedules as well as trailers, movie news, movie history, and movie games).
158. TNT provides a wide variety of programming choices, including feature films, sports, syndicated
series, special events and original made-for-television movies. See TNT Homepage (visited Apr. 17, 2000)
<http://tnt.turner.com/>.
159. TBS, Ted Turner's first cable network, hit the air as a UHF channel in 1970, and began satellite
transmission in 1976. See TBS Homepage: About TBS (visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://tbssuperstation.com/
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larger variety of programming. Beyond merely operating cable networks, however, the
TBS Entertainment group also owns several professional sports franchises,' 61 a professional wrestling organization, 6 2 and an international amateur sports competition. 63
Finally, TBS Entertainment has also cooperated with other companies in joint ventures
for cable television, such as the CourtTV Network. 64
In contrast to the eclectic TBS Entertainment approach, Time Warner's other two
network clusters are much more narrowly focused. First, all of the thirteen networks
165
within the CNN group concentrate on either general or specialized news reporting.
Next, the Home Box Office group contains ten premium' 66 networks under the Home
Box Office ("HBO") and Cinemax labels that show movies and some individualized
168
programming,' 67 and one joint venture, the Comedy Central cable network.
aboutus/ aboutbs.htm>. Driven by reruns and movies, TBS competed with the broadcast networks and
became the first cable station to qualify for ratings. See id. Today, TBS estimates place the network and its
lineup of movies, reruns, and sporting events in three quarters of the households in America. See TBS
Homepage:About TBS supra.
160. The newest of the TBS Entertainment networks, Turner South is "the first entertainment network for
a region of the country-TV from the South, by the South, and for the South." Turner South: About Us
(visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.turnersouth.com/aboutusindex.html>.
Broadcasting movies, sports
(coverage of the three franchises owned by TBS Entertainment, see infra note 161), and original programming
(Southern Living Presents, Live from the Bluebird Cafe), the network hopes "to provide quality entertainment,
but also help build regional pride and a sense of community." Id.
161. TBS Entertainment owns three major sports teams, all based in Atlanta: the Braves (Major League
Baseball), the Hawks (National Basketball Association) and the Thrashers (National Hockey League). See
About Time Warner: Cable Networks: TBS Entertainment: Businesses (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.
timewarner.com/ corp/about/cablenets/turnerent/compbrandprod.html>.
162. TBS Entertainment owns World Championship Wrestling, a professional wrestling association
whose matches are broadcast on several of the TBS Entertainment networks. See id.
163. TBS Entertainment owns the Goodwill Games, a competition similar to the Olympics, begun by Ted
Turner in 1986. See, e.g., Goodwill Games 1998: Summer of Goodwill (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.
goodwillgames98.comlsummer/overview.html>.
164. CourtTV was created in 1991 as a joint effort between Time Warner and the Liberty Media
Corporation. See CourtTV Homepage: About CourtTV (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.courttv.com/about
/aboutcourttv.html>. Subsequently, the network has become well-known for its "gavel-to-gavel" coverage of
some of America's highest profile trials. See id.
165. For example, while CNN remains committed to being "the number-one news network among
Americans," it has now added extra networks to cover more specific topics, including financial news (CNNfn)
and sports (CNNSI), and to deliver news in different ways, such as providing quick updates of major stories
(Headline News) or news for travelers (CNN Airport). About Time Warner: Cable Networks: CNN (visited
Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.comcorp/about/cablenets/turnernews/index.htmi>; see also About
Time Warner: Cable Networks: CNN: Businesses (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.com/
corp/about/cablenets/ turnernews/compbrandprod.html>.
166. Networks are denoted as "premium" when they are not included in standard cable packages, but
instead must be purchased for an additional fee. One purpose of this extra cost is to subsidize the networks'
programming to eliminate the need for commercial advertisements.
167. Note that although HBO and Cinemax began with only one network each, and are often still referred
to by consumers as if they were single, discrete networks, both have now expanded to include additional
networks under their broader headings. Thus, while the "basic" HBO and Cinemax networks both still show
movies and programming appealing to a wide audience, five additional HBO networks (HBO Family, HIBO
Comedy) and three additional Cinemax networks (ActionMax, ThrillerMax) offer a narrower range of
material. See About Time Warner: Cable Networks: Home Box Office: Businesses (visited Apr. 18, 2000)
<http://www.timewarner.comlcorp/aboutlcablenets/hbo/compbrandprod.html>.
While Cinemax remains exclusively a movie channel, HBO has added weekly series (Arli$$, Oz, the
Sopranos), sports coverage, and other specialized programming. See About Time Warner: Cable Networks:
Home Box Office: Brands & Products (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http:/lwww.timewarner.comlcorp/aboutl
cablenets/hbo/selected.html>.
168. Comedy Central, a 24-hour comedy network, is a joint venture between HBO and Viacom. See, e.g.,
Viacom: Businesses: Television: Comedy Central (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.viacom.com/
prodbyunit 1.tin?ixBusUnit=27>.
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As one might expect, Time Warner's cable networks experience two kinds of competition. First, because all networks fill some kind of niche, each of Time Warner's
networks must compete with those other channels televising similar kinds of programming. For HBO and Cinemax, networks that primarily or exclusively show recent feature films, this direct competition comes primarily from the other premium channels,
including Showtime 169 and the Movie Channel, 170 both owned by Viacom, and the Starz
Encore Group channels' 7' owned by the Liberty Media Group LLC.172 Similarly, classic
movie enthusiasts can turn to Turner Classic Movies or the likes of American Movie
Classics, Bravo!, and the Independent Film Channel. 73 Likewise, the CNN family of
networks faces direct competition from other news channels, such as FoxNews and
MSNBC. 174 Although the highly-specialized Comedy Central, CourtTV, and Turner
South have no true peers, the Cartoon Network must compete with Nickelodeon 175 for
children's attention.
Finally, generalists such as TBS and TNT must confront constantly-shifting competition. Because these channels offer a variety of different programming, they face competition from other generalist channels, such as USA 17 6 and Fx, 177 but also from other
competitors depending on what type of shows TNT and TBS are televising. For example, if TNT or TBS shows a movie, as they often do on weekend nights, that channel has
169. Like HBO, Showtime televises movies, but also features sports and original programming as well.
See Viacom: Businesses: Television: Showtime (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.viacom.comi/
prodbyunitl .tin?ixBusUnit=23>.
170. The Movie Channel more closely resembles Time Warner's Cinemax network, in that it shows
movies exclusively. . See Viacom: Businesses: Television: The Movie Channel (visited Apr. 22, 2000)
<http://www.viacom.com/prodbyunitl .tin?ixBusUnit=24>.
171. The Starz Encore Group operates 13 premium channels, offering both general (Starz, Starz Cinema,
New Encore networks) and theme movie programming (Action, Mystery, True Stories, Westerns networks).
See Starz Encore: About StarzEncore (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.encoremovies.com
homepage.html>.
172. The Liberty Media Group LLC is an individually run company, but it is actually a subsidiary of
AT&T.
See Hoover's Online: Liberty Media Group: Capsule (visited Apr. 22, 2000) <http:flwww.
hoovers.comlco/capsule/5/0,2163,51395,00.html>. In addition to having small stakes in approximately 100
cable networks owned primarily by other companies, the Liberty Media Group also owns its own online
company, Liberty Digital, as well as pieces of TV Guide, Time Warner and News Corp. See id.
173. American Movie Classics, showing films made between the 1930s and the 1980s, Bravo!,
broadcasting films and the arts, and the Independent Film Channel, showing only independent films, are all
owned and operated by the Cablevision Systems Corporation ("Cablevision"). See generally AMC Homepage
(visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.amct'v.com/home.html>; Bravo Homepage (visited Apr. 23, 2000)
<http://www.bravotv.coml>; Cablevision Homepage (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.cablevision.comI>;
Independent Film Channel Homepage (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.ifctv.corrV>. In turn, Cablevision,
which also owns properties such as Madison Square Garden, the New York Knicks and Rangers, and Radio
City Music Hall, is partly owned by News Corp. and AT&T. See Cablevision Homepage, supra; Fox
Entertainment GroupAnnual Report 1999: Business Overview, supra note 115; Hoover's Online: Cablevision
Systems Corp.: Capsule (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/2/0,2163,11792,00.
html>.
174. See, e.g., Martha Moore, Winning the Race to Declare Who Won the Race, USA TODAY, Mar. 8,
2000, at 1OA (detailing the competition between CNN, FoxNews, and MSNBC to cover the presidential race).
175Nickelodeon, which broadcasts children's programming during the day and "classic" television shows
such as I Love Lucy and Happy Days in the evening as "Nick-at-Night," is owned and operated by Viacom.
See Viacom: Businesses: Television (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.viacom.comlunitbyseg.tinsBus
Segment Nickname=tv>.
176. The USA Network, which shows movies, original, and syndicated series, is one of several significant
cable networks owned by USA Networks, Incorporated, including the Sci-Fi Channel, Black Entertainment
Television, and the Home Shopping Network. See Hoover's Online: USA Networks, Inc.: Capsule (visited
Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/3/0,2163,52963,00.html>;
USA Network Homepage
(visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.usanetwork.coiV>.
177. Fx is one of the many cable channels operated by Fox Broadcasting. See Fox EntertainmentGroup
Annual Report 1999: Business Overview, supra note 115. Like TBS and TNT, Fx shows a mixture of movies,
syndicated series, and original programs. See id.
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to battle the variety of movie channels mentioned previously during that time period. In
contrast, when one of the Time Warner networks shows a professional baseball or basketball game, it competes for viewers with the sports networks, such as the ESPN networks 7 8 and FoxSports. 79
Complicating this entire picture even further, however, is the fact that most viewers
do not watch one kind of programming exclusively. 8 0° As a result, all of Time Warner's
cable networks must also indirectly compete against all of the other available cable networks.' 8' Particularly in today's culture, where "channel surfing" has become an everyday phrase, the cross-elasticity of demand in cable television programming is extremely
high. Furthermore, although to this point cable networks have been discussed as a separate industry from broadcast networks, as far as viewers and ratings are concerned, the
lines of demarcation between cable and broadcast television are blurring like never before. 182 Unlike the early days of cable programming, when fewer households had cable
access and most cable networks were highly-specialized, today's cable channels are
increasingly willing to challenge the broadcast networks. 83 And analysts suggest that
the cable networks are succeeding in "stealing" broadcast television's viewers in greater
and greater numbers.' 84 Given the ever-increasing competition between cable and
broadcast television, then, it is fair to conclude that all networks, broadcast and cable,
must now compete with each other and that the cross-elasticity of demand among television networks may increase even further.
178. ESPN actually operates four sports networks: ESPN and ESPN2, which both show a variety of
sports programming, ESPNews, which features round-the-clock sports news reporting, and ESPN Classic,
which replays tapes of historic and memorable games. See ESPN: TV Listings (visited Apr. 23, 2000)
<http://espn.go.comltvlistings/index.html>; see also supra note 84.
179. FoxSports is actually a number of local sports networks all joined together under the Fox monikercable viewers then receive coverage of their nearby sports teams. See Fox Entertainment Group Annual
Report 1999: Business Overview, supra note 115.
180. As early as 1960, courts recognized that "[viariety is the spice and therefore the necessity of TV
programming." United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 164, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This
realization, combined with the similarity of purpose behind all broadcast television programming, i.e. the
gathering of advertising revenues, led the court in Columbia Pictures to conclude that broadcast television
programming in general (rather than any one type of programming individually) was a line of commerce. See
id.
181. Given that today the cable networks fight among each other just as the broadcast networks did in
1960, it logically follows that all cable networks are together in one line of commerce. See, e.g., Cable
Holdings of Georgia v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559 (11 th Cir. 1987); Satellite Television v. Continental
Cablevision, 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983).
182. In fact, in the years since Columbia Pictures,courts have recognized cable and broadcast television
as interchangeable substitutes, despite the fact that broadcast stations are "free." See, e.g., Cable Holdings of
Georgia v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559 (11 th Cir. 1987); Satellite Television v. ContinentalCablevision,
714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983).
183. See, e.g., Carter,supra note 112; Weinraub, supra note 112.
184. See, e.g., Tom Bierbaum, B'casters Can'tSweep Away TBS, ESPN, Nick, VARIETY, Dec. 6, 1999, at
28 (noting that even ABC's Who Wants to Be a Millionaire couldn't keep cable networks TBS, ESPN, and
Nickelodeon from posting ratings gains); Weinraub, supra note 112 ("CBS, like the other [broadcast]
networks, is struggling to retain audiences for its series .... [Broadcast n]etwork television audiences have
diminished because of competition from cable .... ").
The broadcast networks are not powerless in this struggle, however; each member of the big three has
started its own cable network(s) and is affiliated with others, NBC operates CNBC and MSNBC and joined
with ABC and the Hearst Corporation to create the A&E family of networks. See Hoover's Online: National
Broadcasting Company, Inc.: Capsule, supra note 121; see also supra note 83. In addition to A&E, ABC is
linked to the ESPN and Disney networks through its parent company, Disney. See Walt Disney Company
1999 Annual Report, supra note 62. CBS owns the Nashville Network and Country Music Television, and
soon will be owned by Viacom, which already owns MTV, Nickelodeon, VHI, and other cable networks. See
Hoover's Online: CBS Corporation:Capsule, supra note 122; Viacom: Businesses: Television (visited Apr.
22, 2000) <http://www.viacom.com/unitbyseg.tin?sBusSegmentNickname=tv>.
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5. Cable Systems
As Section 3 indicated with regard to the music business, Time Warner has vertically-integrated itself into that industries, so as to have as much control over and exact
as much of a profit from it as possible. Time Warner's approach to cable television is
no different: in addition to owning cable networks, i.e. the channels that provide the
programming, Time Warner has also gathered extensive holdings in the cable systems
industry, i.e. the companies that wire houses and provide cable access to paying subscribers. In fact, Time Warner Cable has now equipped over twenty million homes and
currently has over twelve million subscribers. 185 In contrast to its other industries, however, Time Warner's primary competition in cable systems is not a media conglomerate.
Instead it is the telecommunications giant, Atlantic Telephone and Telegraph Corporation ("AT&T"), whose Broadband and Internet Services division is now poised to overtake Time Warner as the number one provider of cable service in the country.186
While the cable systems industry may seem to be just one piece of the overall cable
industry and nothing more, however, in actuality it is currently the site of a flurry of
competitive maneuvering. Because Internet access over copper telephone lines has both
speed and volume limitations that prevent many information-sharing tasks
from being
89
88
performed efficiently, 187 Internet users are now turning to cable modems and DSLs1
185. See About Time Warner: Cable Systems (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.timewarner.com/corp/
aboutlcablesys/index.html>.
186. See Hoover's Online: AT&T Broadband and Internet Services: Capsule (visited Apr. 23, 2000)
<http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/l/0,2163,14891,00.html> (detailing AT&T's 1999 purchase of major
cable provider TCI and its upcoming acquisition of the MediaOne Group, Inc. which will push it into first
place).
187. For example, Bill Gates described how, with current technology and transfer speeds, downloading
music off the Internet is practical while downloading video is not. See Noah Robischon, The Emperor Strikes
Back, ENTERTAINMENT WKLY., Jan. 7, 2000, at 28 (discussing the future of technology and media with Bill
Gates). In addition, current dial-up service requires the user "to place-and pay for-a telephone call to
establish a connection." David D. Clark, High Speed DataRaces Home, Sci. AM., Oct. 1999, at 94.
188. Cable modems perform basically the same function as the telephone modems with which most
people are more familiar: they facilitate a two-way transfer of information. See Clark, supra note 187.
However, cable modems allow transfers to be made to and from televisions over cable lines instead computers
via phone lines--the cable lines can accommodate a much larger amount of information and can perform
transfers much faster than traditional phone lines, plus there is no need to ever disconnect from the Internet.
See id. Different kinds of cable allow for different transmission speeds-traditional coaxial cable, which most
people use within their homes to connect the television set to the cable jack, transmits faster than telephone
wire, while transmissions along fiber-optic cable, which sends information in the form of light, can literally
approach lightspeed. See id. In such fiber-optic systems, transmission is only slowed by the transformation of
information from electrical signals into light and back, but current research is close to eliminating even this
barrier. See John S. MacNeil, Information Acceleration: New Device Speeds Data, U.S. NEWS ONLINE (Apr.
17, 2000) <http://www.usnews.conusnews/issue/000417/opto.htm/>.
Most cable companies have now upgraded their systems to a hybrid of coaxial and fiber-optic cables. See
Clark, supra note 187. However, rather than replace their entire systems with fiber-optic lines, a move that
would have cost too much money, time, and inconvenience for customers, companies have chosen to integrate
the two forms of cable. See id. Fiber-optic lines now typically run either to the curb or to the house, where
coaxial cable begins. See id.
These systems are not perfect, however. The two inherent drawbacks to cable Internet systems are
fluctuations in transfer rates and security. Much like a common water or gas utility, the capacity of cable
systems is shared among one's neighbors-thus, transfers can slow as more people connect to the Internet.
See Harry Levins, Cable and High-Speed Telephone Lead the Way toward FasterAccess, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2000, at A7. Furthermore, because cable is a "shared" system, and users' PCs remain
connected to the Internet, there is the risk that enterprising hackers could infiltrate the users' computers. See
id. For even more information on Internet access via cable systems, see Milo Medin & Jay Rolls, The Internet
Via Cable, SCi. AM., Oct. 1999, at 100.
189. DSLs, or digital subscriber lines, are similar to basic copper phone lines; instead of running singly
and traditional switching equipment, however, DSLs utilize wire pairs and special, high-speed switches to
increase the speed of data transfers. See Clark, supra note 187. Like cable modems, DSLs offer the advantage
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to provide so-called "high-speed" access. Because these two technologies are currently
seen as at least the near-future of Internet access, companies such as Time Warner and
AT&T are staking out as much territory in the cable systems industry as possible in an
attempt to become the primary conduit to the Internet. But, given that both cable and
DSL access have drawbacks and mainstream America is currently unfamiliar with both,
it remains unclear which system will win out. While AT&T, with telephone and cable
systems, has the luxury of positioning itself in both technologies, Time Warner has emphasized cable modem technology to maximize the importance of its cable systems.
One final wrinkle in the cable systems industry is the growing presence of satellite
programming companies. Frustrated with the limited choices offered by local cable
systems, many customers have started purchasing service from satellite companies that
can beam signals to subscribers' homes from almost anywhere in the world. Unlike
"traditional" cable systems, which charge only a monthly fee, satellite television customers must often purchase hardware, such as a satellite dish, in order to receive their
programming a9 -in the past, such start-up costs were a major drawback to satellite
service. However, major satellite providers now offer financing' 91 that can significantly
reduce costs that must be borne up-front. This development, combined with recent legislative proposals that would allow satellite providers to carry local broadcast
channels, 192 has greatly increased the attractiveness of satellite television. 93 And, while
satellite technology has not yet begun to challenge wiring systems in terms of Internet
access, as some technology experts believe it ultimately will, 1 94 satellite television has
grown to the point where both satellite and "traditional"
cable companies now target
95
each other relentlessly in mainstream advertising.'
To respond tothe growth in satellite subscriptions, "traditional" cable systems companies such as Time Warner and AT&T have taken strides to make cable connections
more valuable to consumers. To this end, the companies have expedited their integration of fiber-optic cable into their networks, have begun massive advertising campaigns
of never having to disconnect one's system from the Internet. See id. Unlike cable systems, however, DSLs
are individualized-not having to share the connection with neighbors means guaranteed transmission speeds
and system security. See Levins, supra. However, DSLs are slower than fiber-optic cables, and currently
DSL customers must be within a certain distance of their telephone company's switching station to take
advantage of them. See Clark, supra note 187. For more information on DSLs, see George T. Hawley, DSL:
Broadbandby Phone, ScI. AM., Oct. 1999, at 102.
190. See DirecTV: About DirecTV: DirecTV Receivers (visited Apr. 26, 2000) <http://www.directv.
comoverview/ overviewpages/0,1098,77,00.html> (discussing the receivers which include an 18" satellite
dish).
191. See, e.g., DirecTV: About DirecTV: New Customer Q&A (visited Apr. 26, 2000) <http://www.
directv.com/overview/overviewpages/0, 1098,69,00.html>.
192. See Art Pine, House OKs Bill to FosterLocal Programson Satellite TV, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2000,
at Al; Andrew Pollack, After Space, Hughes Battles Time: Chasing Cable Foes to a Web Future, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2000, § 3 at 1.
193. See Pollack, supra note 192 (describing in detail the recent successes of Hughes Electronics, owner
of DirecTV and subsidiary of General Motors). But see Peter Foster, Satellite Nationalism, NAT'L POST, Mar.
17, 2000, at C7 (commenting on the news that U.S. satellite telephone company Iridium would deorbit its
satellites and noting "how costly it can be to misread fast-changing telecommunications and entertainment
delivery markets").
194. See, e.g., Robert P. Norcross, Satellites: The Strategic High Ground, SCI. AM., Oct. 1999, at 106
(suggesting that "if you want to see the future of broadband communications, look to the stars" because
satellite systems "avoid many of the complications that plague ground-based networks" such as the distance
limits of DSLs and the volume constraints of cable modem technology). But see Clark, supra note 187 ("Of
all the broadband options now emerging, satellite-based service is the most advanced and the most riskyfrom both a technical and an investment perspective.").
195. Advertising from the traditional companies has been extremely focused, suggesting that the purchase
of hardware is expensive and unnecessary when digital cable programming and high speed Internet access are
possible "through the cable you already have."
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regarding cable Internet access, and also have begun offering digital programming,
which offers more network choices and a higher quality picture. 196 Furthermore, to
capitalize on high-speed cable access while it is still "hot," both AT&T and Time Warner have introduced high-speed Internet services.1 97 While high-speed cable Internet
access may attract customers back away from satellite systems in the short term, it remains extremely unclear how the future of all of these technologies will coalesce.
6. Summary
While Time Warner's subdivisions each face competition within their particular industry, very few companies boast holdings with either the breadth or depth of Time
Warner. As a result, when seen as a giant amalgam of media companies, Time Warner
faces competition primarily from the other massive media conglomerates. While not
every conglomerate has a presence in every media industry, the overlaps that exist between these giant companies mean that at least two or three conglomerates are active in
every area. The one glaring exception to this pattern is in the cable systems market,
where Time Warner is competing not with entertainment companies, but instead with
traditional communication powers such as AT&T.
C. The AOL/Time Warner "Vision"
When the AOL-Time Warner merger was first announced, the most common sentiment expressed was that the companies were "a natural fit" for one another. 98 AOL,
despite its huge membership and historic success, knew that a challenge was on the
horizon: the speed of cable modems and DSLs threatened to make AOL's dial-up access
to the Internet obsolete. 199 Time Warner, by investing so heavily in these technologies,
would provide AOL with a way to recreate itself as the public begins to switch over.
Plus, as always, AOL was looking for more online content to feed its subscribers to keep
them satisfied-unlike AT&T, a media conglomerate such as Time Warner would also
fill that need perfectly. 20 0 From Time Warner's perspective, AOL represented not only
millions of customers for its various products, but a new way to access those customers
that was
even more direct than the Web itself: via most people's launching point to the
20
Web. 1
These shorter-term benefits to the companies were only a part of the reasoning behind the merger, however. Both Case and Levin envision a not-too-distant future when
listening to the radio, watching broadcast television or cable, and using Internet applications will all be merged into one process that can be performed on one piece of equip-

196. See Pollack, supra note 192.
197. There are two leading cable online service providers: Road Runner and AT&T@Home. Road
Runner was created in 1998 as a joint venture between Time Warner, MediaOne Group, Inc., Microsoft,
Compaq Corp., and Advance/Newhouse. See Road Runner High-Speed Online: Company Online (visited
May 1, 2000) <http://www.rr.com/rdrun/>. Road Runner provides high-speed Internet access through the
subscriber's cable lines. See id.
AT&T@Home is a product of telecommunications giant AT&T-like Road Runner, AT&T@Home offers
AOL-like service over cable modems. See AT&T@Home: FrequentlyAsked Questions (visited May 1, 2000)
<http://www.athome.att.com/pages/faq.html>.
198. AOL Buys Time Warnerfor $166 Billion in Stock, supra note 1 (quoting Time Warner CEO Gerald
Levin). See also Glass, supra note 1; Syre & Stein, supra note 1.
199. See AOL Buys Time Warnerfor $166 Billion in Stock, supra note 1; Glass, supra note 1; Syre &
Stein, supra note 1.
200. See AOL Buys Time Warnerfor $166 Billion in Stock, supra note 1; Glass, supra note 1; Syre &
Stein, supra note 1.
201. See AOL Buys Time Warner for $166 Billion in Stock, supra note 1; Glass, supra note 1; Syre &
Stein, supra note 1.
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ment.2 °2 The executives' faith in this forecast, and their corresponding belief that a unified AOL-Time Warner can best help the world reach such a technological plateau, was
blatantly evident during their recent testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
(the "Committee") regarding the merger's implications. 20 3 There, Case described the
marriage of the two companies as not just a merger of businesses, but rather "a merger
of ideas, a shared commitment to empower consumers, community, families and citizens, building a global medium that benefits society. '' 204 The new AOL-Time Warner,
Case continued, would "be able to provide
205 consumers [with what they need], across
industries, across platforms, across media."
Levin echoed his new partner's sentiments, noting that the two men had seen "the
company of the future, a company with the creative infrastructure to provide a constant
stream of quality content, plus a genetic appreciation of how to form web communities
and how to serve them easily and conveniently., 20 6 Levin further postulated that the
merger "could create the first enterprise not only fully prepared to compete on the Internet.., but a company... to bring[ ] consumers everywhere the speed and immediacy
of broadband across all delivery platforms, wired or wireless, thus unlocking the fullest
possibilities of interactivity., 20 7 Finally, Levin somewhat immodestly concluded20 that
8
AOL-Time Warner would be "really a prototype [company] for th[e] 21st century.,
It should be noted that this theory of an impending computer-media unification is not
solely the product of Case and Levin's inspiration; rather it is a concept shared by other
technological visionaries as well. 20 9 Given that fact, and the other powerful players in
the computer and media industries, Case and Levin were each under considerable pressure before the merger to ensure that their companies would not be bystanders to the
coming revolution. Thus, when the possibility of the AOL-Time Warner union arose,
both men recognized that such a marriage would provide the bases in the computer and
media industries necessary to launch such a daring venture, and both jumped at the
chance.
Beyond their new company's ability to revolutionize technology, Case and Levin
also alluded to AOL-Time Warner's capacity to evoke social reforms via their burgeoning enterprise. Case articulated special concern over what he called "the digital
divide"-the disparity of access to computers based on socioeconomic status-and,
202.
question
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Although experts agree on the overall trend, they disagree on whether the piece of equipment in
will be the television set or the personal computer.
See Hearings,supra note 67, at *10-22.
Id., at *11 (statement of Stephen Case, CEO AOL).
Id. at *13 (statement of Stephen Case, CEO AOL).
Id. at *19 (statement of Gerald Levin, CEO Time Warner).
Id.

208. Id.
209. In particular, Microsoft chairman Bill Gates's description of the future of technology and
entertainment is strikingly similar to the vision articulated by Case and Levin. See Robischon, supra note 187.
Gates suggests that, as has already begun in the music industry, soon all media will be stored digitally-such
an evolution could have several consequences, including (1) a potentially expanded role for the PC, as
consumers could use computers to acquire, store, and manipulate media products, (2) a corresponding
emphasis on interactivity between various kinds of media hardware (e.g., video cameras, stereos, televisions)
and PCs, (3) the possible elimination of "physical media" (CDs, DVDs, video and audio cassettes), and (4) an
increasing ability for consumers to personally tailor their media choices. See id. (discussing the future and
previewing some of the media "techno-baubles" that will require Microsoft software). Despite these
predictions and contrary to the fears of many media companies, Gates maintains that Microsoft is not
interested in becoming a media company. See id. ("[Olne thing I just can't be clear enough about is that we
are not an entertainment company.... Picking scripts, picking story lines ....is not the skill set of
Microsoft.... We're enabling neat things and we want to see other companies do the entertainment using our
technology.").
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after recapping AOL's efforts to bridge that gap, Case expressed optimism at the
thought of AOL and Time Warner "joining... [their] resources and sharing ... [their]
ideas to close this divide. 210 Case also emphasized his commitment to "make sure that
the Worldwide Web is not worldwide in name only," comparing the quick strides made
in wiring the country and the world to the far slower spread of electricity across America during the previous century.211 Case concluded this part of his remarks by restating
"AOL-Time Warner's shared mission of building a truly global medium, as essential to
people's lives as the telephone or the television. 2 2
Building on Case's comments, Levin reiterated his firm's "sense of community responsibility," exemplified by Time founder Henry Luce's edict that the company always
operate "in the public interest as well as the interest of ... [its] shareholders. 2 13 After
detailing Time Warner's individual efforts toward community service, Levin again
commented on the "clear and present danger" of the "digital divide." 214 But Levin assured the Committee that "nothing has been more crucial to the agreement we've
reached.., than our vision of AOL-Time Warner's ability to be a catalyst for meaningful change in the way our country, indeed our world, offers its children
the opportunity
21 5
for creative expression, intellectual enrichment and material success.
Im. Analysis of the Merger and its Implications
As Part II describes, the proposed AOL-Time Warner merger is truly a union of giants. Consequently, this Part examines the legality of the proposed merger in two different ways. First, the marriage will be analyzed using the government's merger guidelines to simulate the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") pending review of the deal.
Second, given the widespread predictions that the merger will be approved, the proposed
union will be scrutinized in terms of its long-term implications for the computer and
media industries and consumers.
A. The Government's Upcoming Analysis of the Merger
Governmental review of mergers is dictated by section 7 of the Clayton Act, which
forbids acquisitions whose "effect.. .may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly., 21 6 Although the statute itself lacks definitive enforcement
standards, the Department of Justice and the FTC have promulgated Horizontal and
Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines ("Guidelines") 217 to describe their enforcement poli210. Id. at *15 (statement of Stephen Case, CEO AOL).
211. Id. at *16.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *21 (statement of Gerald Levin, CEO Time Warner).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1994)). Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides, in relevant part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Furthermore, both the Department of Justice and the FTC have concurrent authority
to enforce Clayton § 7. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(a), 25 (1994).
217. There are two sets of Merger Guidelines, one for horizontal mergers, i.e. mergers between direct
competitors within the same industry, and another for non-horizontal mergers, i.e. vertical or conglomerate
mergers between non-competing companies engaged in different industries. Although both sets of Guidelines
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cies. Thus, to anticipate the FTC's review, 218 this section will apply the Guidelines to
the AOL-Time Warner merger.219 Such an analysis involves three broad steps: identifying the companies' relevant geographic and product markets, calculating the primary
market's Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") of concentration, and finally examining
whether, given the market definition and concentration, the merger portends any conduct that the Guidelines deem problematic.
1. Market Definition
Analysis of the AOL-Time Warner pairing must begin with a definition of the product and geographic markets occupied by the two companies.
a. Product market
To delineate the scope of the product market and to account for cross-elasticity of
demand, the Guidelines prescribe the "price increase test," wherein one imagines a hypothetical monopoly in a given product and then asks what would happen if the monopolist increased prices by a "small but significant and nontransitory" amount.22° If, as
a result of the price increase, enough customers switched to the "next best substitute" of
the given product to make the increase unprofitable, that substitute is included within the
product market definition. 22' This test is performed until all suitable substitutes are
accounted for; the product market is defined as the smallest group of products that satisfy the price increase test.222
To define AOL's product market, one must begin with the narrowest possible definition of AOL's service: AOL acts as its subscribers' dial-up Internet service provider
("ISP"), i.e. facilitating access to the Web, while simultaneously offering online "services," i.e. providing email, other programs, and content. Currently, AOL, Earthlink, and
Prodigy are the only companies that provide this kind of product to a significant number
of customers. The only real alternatives for consumers come from either (1) dial-up
companies that act strictly as ISPs with no content or service, or (2) companies offering
AOL-like service combined with high-speed access through cable connections. However, one must seriously question whether either of these sets of companies passes the
price increase test.
First, consider the ISP-only companies. While most of the ISP-only companies remain small, they are increasing in number and have begun to present themselves in adwere originally issued together in 1984, the Non-Horizontal Guidelines remain in their original form, while the
Horizontal Guidelines were reissued in 1992 and revised in 1997. Both sets of Guidelines are available in
several places, including the Federal Register and directly through the FTC and Department of Justice
websites. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992); 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49
Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984); Dept. of Justice: Antitrust Division: Public Documents: Guidelines & Policy
Statements (visited Apr. 26, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/guidelin.htm>;
FTC:
Antitrust/Competition:Guidelines (visited Apr. 26, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/guidelin.htm>.
218. Although either the Department of Justice or the FTC can review a potential merger, in this case, the
FTC has stepped forward to undertake the analysis. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 67, at *8 (prepared
statement of Sen. Kohl, suggesting that the "merger is likely to pass, in whole or in part, at... the FTC");
Ariana Eunjung Cha, Foes of AOL Merger Take to Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2000, at E3
(discussing possible testimony before "the Federal Trade Commission, which is reviewing the antitrust
implications of the AOL-Time Warner merger").
219. Given that AOL and Time Warner "do not operate in the same market," their merger is nonhorizontal. 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 4, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,834 (1984).
220. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.11, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,554 (1992). As the Guidelines
suggest, in most cases a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase will be assumed to be a five percent
increase with no reduction expected within the foreseeable future. See id. at 41,555.
221. See id. at4l,555 &n.9.
222. See id.
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vertising as competitors of AOL. 223 However, several of the ISP-only services are completely free to consumers, 224 yet AOL with its monthly fee does not appear to be losing
any subscribers to them. 225 Given that AOL customers are willing to pay approximately
$20 per month 226 rather than utilize an ISP-only service free of charge, it is unlikely that
a "small but significant and nontransitory" price increase would drive AOL customers
away.
Similarly, the high-speed services seem like they should be more attractive. Their
services are easy-to-use and have the advantages of cable access. 227 However, these
companies have not slowed AOL's meteoric growth, nor have they achieved subscriber
bases of their own sufficient to compete with AOL' S.228 In addition, the primary highspeed services are already significantly more expensive than AOL. 229 Thus, a "small but
significant and nontransitory" AOL price increase is unlikely to drive AOL customers
away.
Given that ISP-only and high-speed companies fail the price increase test, AOL's
product market should be defined narrowly. AOL is an ISP that also provides "service"
via a dial-up connection.
Time Warner's product markets are a bit more challenging to define, given the
breadth of Time Warner's operations. One can begin with any one of Time Warner's
four media industries, publishing, filmed entertainment, music, or cable networks-an
application of the price increase test suggests that all four industries can be considered
together under a broad "media entertainment" product heading. Such a conclusion is
reached by considering first the interchangeability of products within each media industry. For example, within the filmed entertainment industry, if feature film prices were
increased a "small but significant and nontransitory" amount, the video, cable, and network television sectors would likely reap the benefits as movie-goers began to stay
home more regularly and search for alternative visual entertainment. 230 Similarly, if the
price of books were raised, avid readers could shift to buying magazines, or vice-versa.
Moving onward, then, one can imagine analogous interchangeability between media
industries, i.e. that if prices within all of one media industry were elevated, consumers
who traditionally favor that industry would look elsewhere for entertainment. For example, if the entire publishing industry, magazines, newspapers, and books alike, raised
223. See, e.g., NetZero Homepage (visited Apr. 26, 2000) <http://www.netzero.com/> (offering itself to
consumers as an ISP and including its national television advertising campaign presenting itself as an
alternative to AOL).
224. See id. (offering free Internet access); see also supra note 59.
225. This conclusion is based on the fact that AOL's subscriber totals keep increasing. Note, however,
that because there are no data tracking individual subscribers, one cannot refute the proposition that AOL's
positive growth rate is a product of greater numbers of new subscribers "masking" the number of AOL
subscribers leaving the company for ISP-only companies and other competitors.
226. See AOL: Pricing Plans (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.aol.comlinfo/pricing.html>.
227. See supra note 197 (describing the Road Runner and AT&T@Home services).
228. One reason may be that the high-speed services are not even available in all the places where the
particular parent company does business. See, e.g., Road Runner High-Speed Online: Availability, (visited
May 1, 2000) <http://www.rr.com/rdrun/> (listing the locales where the service is currently available, and
suggesting that "[a]t this time we do not have definitive plans to launch Road Runner in your area....
However, our goal is to have Road Runner available to all of the homes passed by Time Warner and
MediaOne cable systems by year-end 2000.").
229. For example, Roadrunner charges a monthly fee of approximately $40, twice as much as AOL, plus
a one-time connection fee of $100. See Roadrunner High Speed Online: Availability, supra note 228. AT&T
charges similar rates for its AT&T@Home service. See AT&T@Home: Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 197.
230. This conclusion rests on the assumptions that (1) the higher prices charged by the filmmakers will be
passed on by theater chains to movie-goers, and (2) most movie-goers have television sets and/or cable
subscriptions.
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its prices a "small but significant and nontransitory" amount, readers might begin to
watch more cable and network television, listen to more music, or attend more
movies. 23 While this logic relies on the idea that media entertainment is fungible, such
an assumption is justified when one considers that each of the media industries targets a
nearly identical demographic group as its key consumers.232
In addition to a "media entertainment" market, however, one must also consider
Time Warner's interests in cable systems. The narrowest definition of a cable systems
industry would include only those "traditional" companies that delivered programming
to paying subscribers via some mix of coaxial and fiber-optic cable. However, the
popularity of satellite television systems has now increased to the point where such systems may be a legitimate substitute for most traditional cable customers. Significantly,
"[s]atellite television has attracted not only rural dwellers who do not have access to
cable"; instead, a majority of satellite companies' new subscribers are "urban consumers
who want more channels than cable can provide or are disenchanted by their local cable
monopoly's service., 233 This trend, combined with the decreasing price and increased
availability of satellite programming, 234 suggests that a price increase by traditional
cable providers would drive customers to satellite service. As such, the proper product
market for Time Warner's cable systems would be a "cable provider" market that includes both traditional and satellite programming providers.
b. Geographic market
Closely related to the product market definition is the geographic market determination-as with product markets, one must calculate the geographical limits to which consumers will go for alternatives when faced with a hypothetical monopolist's "small but
significant and nontransitory" price increase.235
In AOL's case, consumers looking for an alternative online service provider could
and would probably search the Internet for a replacement. Based on the online service
product definition, an alternative company would have to be providing some kind of
content to its members-this means that the service would likely have established a
website to supply its existing customers and to attract new ones. The existence of a
website means that prospective subscribers worldwide would be able to find and access
231. This, of course, assumes that the different kinds of entertainment are relatively fungible for
consumers, but such assumptions have been relied upon before. See, e.g., Satellite Television v. Continental
Cablevision, 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983) (utilizing district court's product market definition that combined
"cinema, broadcast television, video disks and cassettes, and other types of leisure and entertainment-related
businesses").
232. Compare Geoff Boucher, Selling Millions on a Sour Note, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2000, at Calendar
p.6 (detailing the mixed emotions of music industry executives who "can't stand much" of today's teen pop
music, but are thrilled because "albums are flying off the shelves and selling to [their] key demographics"),
with Ann Marie Kerwin, Bet is Set for Us Weekly as Showtime Approaches, ADVER. AGE, Mar. 13, 2000, at 3

(discussing the risks taken in launching a new weekly magazine that attempts to steal readers "18-to-34, the
key demographic"), with Bob Raissman, Network Takes Gamble, Risks Conflict of Interest, DAILY NEWS
(New York), Mar. 30, 2000, at 6 (noting that televised broadcasts of the World Wrestling Federation have
"already captured the key 12-to-24 age group"), with Susan Stark, Scream 3 Ends the Hip Slasher Trilogy with
a Good Thrill, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 4, 2000, at Dl (alluding to the talents of screenwriter Kevin Williamson,
"whose uncanny way of tapping into the key 18-30 demographic" has driven the success of the film franchise).
If different forms of media entertainment were not interchangeable, one would expect to see each industry
targeting different groups of consumers, i.e. movie fans would be distinguishable from music buffs, and so
forth.
233. Pollack, supra note 192 (noting that "some 70% of DirecTV's new subscribers live in areas where
cable television is available").
234. See supranotes 190-95.
235. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.21,57 Fed. Reg. 41,552,41,555-56 (1992).
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the service. Conversely, because subscribers will be accessing the service electronically, the service could be headquartered almost anywhere in the world. Given all of
these possibilities, AOL is competing in a truly global geographic market.
In contrast to AOL, the media entertainment market occupied by Time Warner seems
primarily local. Because media industries trade in physical goods rather than services, if
a monopolist in any of the industries were to raise prices, consumers would be limited to
the retailers within their general locale in searching for substitutes. For example, a music listener who wants to purchase a particular CD will be able to hunt through local
record stores. But assuming that all of the local retailers pass on the monopolist recording company's price increase, the customer will have no choice but to pay the
higher price or do without. Even the Internet will probably not help the hypothetical CD
hunter-because many of the record companies own their online direct marketers, as is
the case with Time Warner and Columbia House, the CD hunter that checks the Web
will likely face the same price increase that he encountered at his local store. A similar
trend is apparent in the cable provider market. Typically, geographic regions are served
by only one traditional cable provider. While a national satellite provider may also
cover that geographic region,236 if one does not, the consumer has little choice but to pay
the cable provider's price increase or go without cable television. Thus, both of Time
Warner's industries compete on local levels.
2. Computationof HHIs
Once product and geographic markets have been defined, one must determine the
degree of the market's concentration-as a market becomes increasingly concentrated,
the potential for a given merger to harm competition rises.237 To calculate concentration, the Guidelines invoke the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"). By summing the
squares of the market shares of a given market's participants, the HIU "reflects the distribution of the market shares," while simultaneously "giv[ing] proportionally greater
weight to the market shares of the larger firms, in accord with their relative importance
in competitive interactions. '238 Market shares are typically measured by dollar sales,
but the shares should be computed "using the best indicator of firms' future competitive
significance., 239 HHI values can range from almost zero to 10,000 in the case of a complete monopoly-the government classifies a market based on its HHI value as being
either unconcentrated (values less than 1000), moderately concentrated (1000-1800), or
highly concentrated (above 1800).240
Subscribership is the lifeblood of the online service market; ever since Compuserve,
Prodigy, and AOL began competing in the 1980s, companies within the online service
market have ranked themselves based on their subscribership totals. 24' As such, sub236. Naturally, satellite providers are limited by the locations and coverage of the satellites they use to
beam signals to their customers. As a result, some more remote regions of the country, such as Hawaii,
currently receive far less satellite service than more densely populated areas, such as the East Coast. See, e.g.,
EchoStar: About Us: Our Satellites (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.dishnetwork.com/profile
thirdlevel-contentechostarlaunches/index.asp>.
However, such limitations could be overcome by a
proliferation in the number of satellites that some analysts expect in the near future. See Norcross, supra note
194.
237. Note that unlike horizontal mergers, which by definition increase market concentration, vertical
mergers cannot affect the concentration of a given market. As a result, instead of calculating market
concentration pre- and post-merger to see the merger's effect, as one would when evaluating a horizontal
merger, here one must calculate the market HHI simply to see if the market is ripe for the kinds of anticompetitive effects that vertical mergers can produce.
238. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.5, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552,41,557-58 (1992).
239. Id. §l.41,at4l,557.
240. Id. § 1.5, at41,557 n.17.
241. See supra Part Il.A.
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scribership, not dollar sales, is probably the best indicator of future competitive significance within the online service industry. Currently, AOL has amassed 24.5 million
subscribers between its AOL and Compuserve services, 242 while Earthlink has gathered
2.5 million and Prodigy has roughly another million.243 Crunching these numbers, the
HHI for the online service market is approximately 7800.24
Similarly, the cable provider market also measures success in terms of subscribership. Among traditional cable systems, which have approximately seventy-five million
subscribers nationwide, 45 Time Warner, with 12.6 million,246 and AT&T, with eleven
million,247 and Comcast Corporation ("Comcast"), with eight million,248 currently dominate. Furthermore, AT&T is in the process of acquiring the MediaOne Group's five
million subscribers, 249 a deal that will elevate AT&T to the top spot in this sector of the
market.250 Satellite programming is currently a duopoly, as Echostar Communications
Corporation ("Echostar"), with 3.4 million subscribers, 25' and DirecTV, with eight milhn the
h
lion, have "acquired all their competitors. ,,252 Combining teetoscos
these two sectors, then,
cable provider industry has a base of 83.4 million subscribers; Time Warner's share of
the market is fifteen percent, while AT&T with its new purchases will swell to nineteen
percent. Comcast, third among traditional providers, and DirecTV, the leader of the
satellite companies, each hold about ten percent of the market; other companies post
253
modest market shares, including: Cox Communications, Incorporated, 6.5 percent,
Adelphia Communications Corporation, six percent,25 4 Liberty Media International, five
percent, 255 and DirecTV's rival Echostar and the Cable Systems Corporation each with
four percent.256 These market shares result in an HIl for the cable
provider industry of
approximately 900, indicating that it is relatively unconcentrated. 57
242. See AOL: Who We Are: Data Points (visited Apr. 26, 2000) <http://corp.aol.com/who
datapoints.html>.
243. See Hoover's Online: Prodigy Communications Corp.: Capsule, supra note 69; Richtel, supra note
69
244. Using a total subscriber base of 28 million people, AOL's market share becomes 88%, Earthlink's
9%, and Prodigy's 3%. Thus, the HHI equation becomes: HI = (88)2 + (9)2 + (3)2 = 7834.
245See Pollack, supra note 192 (noting that in 1999 "there were 3.75 million digital subscribers, just over
5% of all cable customers").
246. See About Time Warner: Cable Systems, supra note 185.
247. See AT&T 1999 Annual Report: AT&T at a Glance (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.att.com/ar1999/glance.html>.
248. See Hoover's Online: Comcast Corp.: Capsule (visited Apr. 28, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.com/
co/capsulei 410,2163,13034,00.html>. Like Time Warner, Comcast is both a cable provider and a cable
programmer, as it controls cable networks such as the E! Entertainment Network and QVC, a popular home
shopping channel. See id.
249. See MediaOne: About Us (visited Apr. 28, 2000) <http://www.mediaone.com/whoweare/
default.htm>.
250. See Hoover's Online: A T&T Broadband and Internet Services: Capsule, supra note 186.
251. See EchoStar: About Us: Company Profile (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.dishnetwork.com
profile/third-levelcontent/history/index.asp>; Pollack, supra note 192.
252. Pollack, supra note 192. In addition, market forecasters predict that satellite television will add four
million new customers during the year 2000. See id.
253. See Hoover's Online: Cox Communications, Inc.: Capsule (visited Apr. 28, 2000) <http:/Iwww.
hoovers.com/co/capsule/9/0,2163,43269,00.htmt>.
254. See Hoover's Online: Adelphia Communications Corp.: Capsule (visited Apr. 28, 2000) <http:/I
www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/9/0,2163,15879,00.html>.
255. See Hoover's Online: i'berty Media Int'l: Capsule (visited Apr. 28, 2000) <http://www.
hoovers.com/co/capsule/6/0,2163,44026,00.html>. Liberty Media International is a subsidiary of the Liberty
Media Group. See supranotes 164, 172.
256. See Hoover's Online: Cable Systems Corp.: Capsule (visited Apr. 28, 2000) <http://www.
hoovers.comlco/capsule/2/0,2163,11792,00.html>.
. 257. The HHI equation becomes: HHI = (19)2 + (15)2 + (10)2 + (10)2 + (6.5)2 + (6)2 + (5)2 + (4)2 +
(4)2 = 921. While the firms listed account for only 80% of the cable provider market, the remaining firms lack
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Unlike the online and cable provider markets, which are service-oriented, the media
entertainment market is more traditional because of its reliance on sales of tangible merchandise. As such, the media entertainment HHI can be evaluated in terms of dollar
sales. Computing the market shares of media entertainment market, Time Warner led
all of the conglomerates in 1999, capturing roughly twenty-five percent of the market,
followed by Disney with twenty-one percent, Sony, sixteen percent , Bertelsmann and
News Corp. each with about thirteen percent, Viacom with twelve percent, and
Dreamworks with one percent.258 Converting these percentages into an HHI, one finds
that the media entertainment market is moderate to highly concentrated, with an HHI of
roughly 1800.259

3.

ObjectionableConduct: ErectingBarriersto Entry
By definition non-horizontal mergers cannot change a market's concentration.26 °
Thus, the Guidelines prohibit vertical mergers only when very specific market conditions are present and, as a result, the merger creates the potential for particular forms of
anti-competitive behavior.26 1 Given that Time Warner was not a disruptive buyer, 262and
neither AOL nor Time Warner is a public utility,2 63 the significant concerns from the
Guidelines' perspective are the possibilities that the merger will eliminate
potential
2 65
competition264 or erect "competitively objectionable barriers to entry.",
To begin, one could consider AOL's purchase of Time Warner as an attempt to
eliminate potential future competition in the online service market from Time Warner's
high-speed Internet service, Road Runner. However, to be objectionable, a nonhorizontal merger must "eliminate" or "remove" a firm from potential competition.266
significant market share; as such, their exclusion from the HHI calculation is not troublesome because the
small shares will become even smaller when squared, and therefore will not affect the HHil significantly. See
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.5, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552,41,557-58 (1992).
258. The total 1999 sales among the conglomerates were -worth approximately $111 billion. See
Hoover's Online: Bertelsmann AG: Capsule, supra note 63 (reporting $14.2 billion); Hoover's Online:
Dreamworks SKG: Capsule, supra note 66 (estimating $1 billion); Hoover's Online: News Corp.: Capsule
(visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.conlco/capsule/6/O,2163,41816,00.html> (reporting $14.3
billion); Hoover's Online: Sony Corp.: Capsule, supra note 65 (reporting $18.1 billion); Hoover's Online:
Time Warner: Capsule (visited May 11, 2000) <http://www.hoovers.comlco/capsule12/0,2163,11482,00.html>
(reporting $27.3 billion); Hoover's Online: Viacom: Capsule, supra note 64 (reporting $12.9 billion);
Hoover's Online: Walt Disney Company: Capsule, (visited May 11, 2000 <http://www.hoovers.comlcol
capsulet3/0,2163,11603,00.html> (reporting $23.4 billion).
It should be noted that Dreamworks is a privately-held company on a different fiscal year schedule than the
other conglomerates-as such, financial information about the company is based primarily on speculation and
is therefore less reliable. The earnings figure used here is the best number available, but it is merely an
estimate made for Dreamworks's 1998 fiscal year. See Hoover's Online: Dreamworks SKG: Capsule, supra
note 66. Because of this limitation, the calculations here likely underestimate the total size of the market and
Dreamworks' s participation therein.
259. The HHI calculation for the media entertainment industry becomes: HHI = (25)2 + (21)2 + (16)2 +
(13)2 + (13)2 + (12)2 + (1)2 = 1805. However, this HI value should be considered an overestimate; if
Dreamworks's earnings were underestimated by financial analysts, as they probably were, see supra note 66,
Dreamworks would hold a larger share of the market, stealing percentage points away from the other
conglomerates. Squaring these altered market shares would then decrease the HHI value, so it is extremely
likely that the media entertainment market is only moderately concentrated.
260. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 4.0,49 Fed. Reg. 26,823,26,834 (1984).
261. See id.
262. This condition is required to find a violation under § 4.222 of the Non-Horizontal Guidelines. See
id. § 4.222, at 26,836.
263. This is a prerequisite for a violation of § 4.23 of the Non-Horizontal Guidelines. See id. § 4.21, at
26,836.
264. See id. § 4.1, at 26,834.
265. See id. § 4.21, at 26,835.
266. Id. § 4.11, at 26,834.
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Here, that will not be the case because, while the acquisition will give AOL a stake in
Road Runner, the company is a joint venture between Time Warner and several other
firms. As such, AOL will not be able to unilaterally remove Road Runner from the
competitive market. Because Road Runner can still survive and compete with AOL, the
merger will probably not be prohibited on these grounds.267
Next, to find that a merger creates objectionable barriers to entry, the Guidelines require that three "necessary (but not sufficient)" conditions all be satisfied.268 First, the
degree of integration between the two companies' markets must be 'so extensive that
entrants to one market (the 'primary market') also would have to enter the other market
(the 'secondary market')," where the "primary market" label refers to the market in
which the competitive concerns are founded.2 69 Because there are three markets implicated in the AOL-Time Warner merger, one must consider which to designate as the
"primary market," the site of competitive concern. Because of AOL's dominance in the
online service market, one could imagine that the availability of Time Warner's massive
content and access to Time Warner's cable systems could give AOL even more of a
competitive edge over the other online service companies. In addition, one could
imagine Time Warner obtaining competitive benefits over the other media conglomerates by having an affiliation with the dominant online service provider. As a result,
either the online service or the media entertainment market could be a "primary market."
However, neither of these scenarios would likely rise to the point of requiring potential competitors to enter the secondary market. A potential AOL competitor could still
provide online service--even if such a company was completely deprived of Time Warner's content or cable systems, there are enough other cable and media companies to
give such a competitor sufficient content and high-speed access to target a significant
population of subscribers. Furthermore, an entrant to the media entertainment market
would not require an online presence to survive-to even enter the market, such a company would have to be a media conglomerate. As such, even if Time Warner were able
to gain a competitive advantage over other media conglomerates, such a conglomerate
company would still have enough assets to be viable on its own. Given that double
entry will not be required, the AOL-Time Warner merger lacks this factor "necessary"
for finding a vertical merger objectionable.
Notonly must a merger compel double entry, however. In addition, the Guidelines
require that a vertical merger must make the simultaneous entry into both markets more
difficult than it had been previously in order to be objectionable.27 ° Obviously, because
the AOL-Time Warner merger will not compel double entry, this second factor is similarly unsatisfied.
The final criterion required by the Guidelines to establish the erection of objectionable entry barriers is an H-ll value of greater than 1800.271 Because the Guidelines assume that "[b]arriers to entry are unlikely to affect performance if the structure of the
primary market is otherwise not conducive to monopolization or collusion," they scrutinize only vertical mergers affecting highly-concentrated markets.272 Here, the only conceivable primary market that would satisfy the condition is the online service market,
with its HHI of 7800.
267. Although this does not eliminate the possibility that the FrC might require a unified AOL-Time
Warner to relinquish its ownership in Road Runner remove any suggestion of anti-competitive potential.
268. 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 4.21,49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,835 (1984).
269. Id. at 26,835 & n.30.
270. See id. § 4.212, at 26,835.
271. See id. § 4.213, at 26,836.
272. Id.
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Despite the high market concentration in the online service market, two of the three
criteria "necessary but not sufficient" to prohibit the merger remain unsatisfied. As a
result, it is highly unlikely that the FTC will prohibit AOL-Time Warner based on ob-

jectionable barriers to entry. Furthermore, without the possibility of objectionable conduct, the FTC will have no choice but to approve the merger overall.
B. Implications if the Merger is Approved
As one can see from the analysis imposed by the Guidelines, vertical mergers are
rarely challenged successfully. Most antitrust experts seem comfortable with this limited approach because "vertical mergers generally have no inherent anticompetitive
characteristics" 273; some have even maintained that vertical mergers should be considered legal per se.2 74 Given this kind of commentary and the preceding mock-analysis, it
is not surprising that analysts have suggested the proposed AOL-Time Warner union
will meet little resistance from the FTC.275
Unfortunately, however, the proposed AOL-Time Warner union is not "most mergers." As such, the predictions of easy approval raise a difficult question: assuming that
the merger is allowed to proceed, what will post-merger life be like for consumers and
the computer and media industries? While the merger may ultimately benefit mankind
tremendously, this Section proposes that consumers and industry insiders alike should
be concerned by AOL-Time Warner's presence 276 because it presents a variety of277
potentially anti-competitive effects that are not elucidated by a typical merger analysis.
1. Reduction of CurrentHorizontal Competition
Decreases in horizontal competition pose a range of hazards to markets and consumers including increasing prices, a reduction in creativity and innovation, and the limiting
2 79
278
Because of these dangers, both section 1 of the Sherman Act
of consumer choice.
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") 28 0 prohibit multifirm

behavior that can produce such consequences. Unfortunately, a unified AOL-Time
Warner could eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, existing horizontal competition
in either or both of two ways.

273.
274.

IV EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 35.3 at 188 (1984).
See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 225-45 (1978).

275. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 67, at *8 (prepared statement of Sen. Kohl, suggesting that the
"merger is likely to pass, in whole or in part, at both the FTC and FCC"); Shiver, supra note 9 (quoting analyst
that "It's very unlikely that this deal gets blocked.").
276. One possibility that should not be ignored is that the AOL-Time Warner merger will receive
governmental approval, but the union will ultimately fail for practical reasons. See supranote 7.
277. In fact, senators raised several of these concerns during the Judiciary Committee's recent hearings
regarding the merger. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 67, at *5 (opening remarks of Democratic Sen. Leahy)
(wanting "to explore the issue of privacy" in an era where our media tastes can be tracked); id. at *7 (opening
remarks of Republican Sen. Dewine) (worrying about "exactly how (companies such as an AOL-Time
Warner] will be able to continue in the journalistic tradition of unbiased reporting); id.at *9 (opening remarks
of Democratic Sen. Kohl) (expressing concerns about "the emerging American kiretzu of inner-locking
relationships among the major media, Internet and telecom baronies").
278. See, e.g., I EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, § 2.5,51-54 (1980).
279. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994)). In particular, section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
280. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1994)). In particular, section 5 of the FTC Act makes illegal "[uinfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1994). This language, much broader than that of the Sherman or Clayton Acts, gives the FTC the ability to
investigate almost any kind of antitrust violation.
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First, both AOL and Time-Warner have entered into binding agreements with their
new partner's horizontal competitors. For example, AOL has teamed with several of the
media conglomerates, creating the European and Australian AOL services with
Bertelsmann 281 and contracting with Viacom channels for news and entertainment content.2 82 In addition, AOL has also collaborated with direct competitors of Time Warner's cable systems, such as the satellite provider DirecTV 283 and DSL providers
Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, and GTE.2 84 Time Warner is similarly encumbered-along
with Microsoft, MediaOne, Comaq and others, Time Warner owns a piece of the Road
Runner joint venture, which now offers a cable-access online service similar AOL's but
at faster speeds. 28 5 The persistence of any or all these agreements after the merger could
lead to horizontal collusion between AOL-Time Warner and the implicated firms.
The second way a unified AOL-Time Warner might harm horizontal competition is
by continuing the trend of increasing concentration and cooperation within the industries
implicated by the merger. In traditional media sectors, conglomerates are rapidly reducing the number of players in the market-this pattern is exemplified by Time Warner
and EMI's current merger attempt, which will reduce the size of the music industry
oligopoly from five to four. Furthermore, consolidation is spreading across industries as
well; as large conglomerates swallow independent companies within individual sectors,
the conglomerates are increasingly the only companies left standing to compete with
each other.
By itself, such consolidation might not be harmful, because horizontal competition is
maintained overall if similarly-sized companies must fight with each other across a
range of industries. However, in fragile or burgeoning industries, concentration can be
highly detrimental, stifling the innovation and creativity necessary for the industry to
reach its potential. Consider as one example the cable-access online market-because it
involves new technology and is a new phenomenon to consumers, there are only two
major firms in the market, Road Runner, a j6int venture, and AT&T@Home, owned by
AT&T. 216 Not only is Time Warner, one of Road Runner's co-owners, being bought out
by Road Runner competitor AOL, but MediaOne Group, another of Road Runner's coowners is being purchased by AT&T.287 With AT&T holding interests in both companies and AOL having a stake in one, what are the chances that the cable-access industry
will blossom and thrive as it would without such influences?
Furthermore, in addition to the decreasing number of market participants, the few
conglomerates that remain are working together like never before. For example, many
cable networks are the products of joint ventures.28 8 Similarly, high budget feature films
are increasingly the products of multiple studios acting in concert. 289 As consolidation
and cooperation both peak simultaneously, then, one sees fewer and fewer companies
281. See AOL Timeline, supra note 11; see also AOL: Who We Are (visited May 1, 2000)
<http://www.corp.aol.com/whoweare.html?>.
282. See AOL Who We Are: Our Partners (visited May 1, 2000) <http://www.corp.aol.com/
partners.html> (listing partnerships with channels such as CBS, Nickelodeon, and MTV).
283. See AOL Annual Report: Facts/Figures/Timeline(visited May 1, 2000) <http://www.corp.aol.com
annual/facts/facts3.html>.
284. See id.
285. See supra note 197.
286. See id.
287. See supra note 186.
288. See supra notes 83, 164, 168.
289. See, e.g., Claude Brodesser & Charles Lyons, Studio's Feisty Helpmates Carve Tougher Deals,
VARIETY, Feb. 21, 2000, at 1 (suggesting that because studios are "[florced to grapple with slashed operating
budgets and ever-dwindling profit margins," "[olne of the rarest birds in Hollywood these days is a studio
movie fully financed" by one studio).
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working more and more intimately with each other-as a result, these industries become
ripe for collusion and anti-competitive behavior.
2. ProprietaryConduct and Potential Monopolization
Section 2 of the Sherman Ac 9 and section 5 of the FTC Act also forbid individual
firms from using their market power to "monopolize, or [to] attempt to monopolize...291
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.'
However, the next troubling facet of an AOL-Time Warner marriage is the possibility
that one part of the new company could engage in proprietary conduct on behalf of another part. Given the combined power and influence of AOL and Time Warner, such
proprietary conduct could significantly harm AOL-Time Warner's competitors in any or
all of its markets.
The most obvious way for a unified AOL-Time Warner to dominate the landscape
would be for it to completely refuse to deal with other firms. Such refusals could take a
variety of forms: (1) AOL might decide to carry only Time Warner content, (2) Time
Warner might to allow its cable systems' subscribers to only select AOL as their ISP, or
(3) Time Warner could prevent its content from being accessed by non-AOL users.
Concerns about such comprehensive boycotts have been raised by both industry insiders and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.292 In fact, AOL and Time Warner's competitors are so concerned about such scenarios that these companies have dispatched lobbyists to Congress to protest the merger, but have insisted that such talks be
confidential, lest they face retribution if the union is allowed to proceed.293 Public interest groups have also expressed concern, especially regarding the open access to the
Internet that comes from having a choice of ISPs. 294 For their part, AOL and Time
Warner have taken steps to try and alleviate these fears by releasing a Memorandum of
Understanding endorsing ISP choice on Time Warner cable systems 295 and by testifying
290. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1994)).
291.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The elements of the offense of monopolization include not only having
monopoly power, see, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. E.. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), but also using that power to control prices or exclude competition.
Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (articulating the "old view"
of the conduct element, i.e. that a monopolist cannot defend his monopoly even with otherwise legitimate
conduct), with Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph, 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986)
("Today it is clear that a firm with lawful monopoly power has no general duty to help its competitors,
whether by holding a price umbrella over their heads or by otherwise pulling its competitive punches.").
Attempts to monopolize are also characterized by exclusionary conduct, see, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (describing predatory pricing); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (describing essential facility doctrine); Lorain JournalCo. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143 (1951) (describing leveraging), but require additional showings of intent and a dangerous probability
of success, i.e. the ability of the company in question to become a monopoly if the exclusionary conduct is left
unchecked. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
292. For example, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah expressed concerns about proprietary conduct. See
Hearings,supranote 67, passim (remarks by Sen. Hatch).
293. See Eunjung Cha, supra note 218 (chronicling how "Walt Disney Co., several major music
companies and about ten Internet service providers have been holding meetings" with Congressional members,
but how such efforts have been kept confidential so as "to not jeopardize the[ I relationships" between the
companies and AOL).
294. See Douglass, supra note 9 (noting that, although AOL has traditionally favored open access, since
the announcement of the merger with Time Warner, "AOL Chairman Steve case [has been] very ambiguous"
about ISP choice).
295. AOL and Time Warner released the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") on the eve of their
Congressional testimony. See About Time Warner: Cable Systems: Releases/News (visited May 1, 2000) <>
(announcing the companies' "agreements" about ISP choice and including the text of the MOU). While the
document broadly proclaims that "AOL Time Warner is committed to offer consumers a choice among
multiple ISPs," and that "AOL Time Warner will not discriminate in... arrangements [with ISPsI based upon
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before Congress. 296 Despite these protestations to the contrary, however, boycotts are
already be taking place.297 While it is often said that each company can choose with
whom to do business, 298 unilateral refusals to deal such as these can be the basis of monopolization charges if the refusals are designed to harm competition or deny competitors access to an essential facility.299
Steve Case has been quick to point out that "the bedrock principle of the Internet...
is that [customers] will have access to everything," implying that if AOL-Time Warner
were to eliminate choices consumers would go elsewhere. However, proprietary conduct need not completely deprive consumers of certain content to be objectionable. °°
Rather, AOL-Time Warner could also steer consumers to its own products in more understated ways. Some have suggested that AOL could implement a proprietary start-up
screen with multiple links to AOL-Time Warner merchandise and services. 30 1 An even
subtler example would be if AOL-Time Warner manipulated the MovieFone listings of
feature film start times to favor those films produced by Warner Brothers and New
Line. 30 2 In addition, given AOL-Time Warner's goal of "build[ing] some new kinds of
30 3
products and services,
Time Warner competitors are concerned about being excluded
3°4
technologically.
whether or not the ISP is affiliated with Time Warner," the MOU also notes that "all of the foregoing is
subject to all pre-existing obligations of Time Warner." Id. This broad qualification as well as the voluntary
nature of the MOU led several senators to question "whether or not... the promises presented in this [MOU]
will ever materialize in the marketplace." See Hearings, supra note 67, at *3 (prepared statement of Sen.
Hatch).
296. In the face of concerns over proprietary conduct, both Case and Levin repeatedly referred to their
new company's "commitment to provide consumers with an empowering range of choices." See Hearings,
supranote 67, at *11 (prepared statement of Steve Case, CEO AOL).
297. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, ABC Goes Off Cable Systems in Key Markets,N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2000, at
Al; see also infra Part IV.
298. See UnitedStates v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ("In the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal...."). This Colgate doctrine has been held to mean that unilateral refusals to deal cannot violate
Sherman section 1 although, as the Colgate case even indicates, such behavior can violate Sherman section 2.
See, e.g., Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
299. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (holding that
defendant owner of three ski mountains had duty to cooperate with owner of fourth mountain in joint lift ticket
arrangement); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (holding that power plant and high
tension lines owned by power company were an essential facility and therefore power company had to deal
with town that wanted to run its own utility franchise).
300. Hearings,supra note 67, at 24 (response of Steve Case, CEO AOL).
301. In particular, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah expressed concern over the use of proprietary start-up
pages that "would tend to usher the subscribers or the consumers to AOL-Time Warner-owned content."
Hearings,supra note 67, at *24 (questions posed by Sen. Hatch). Case denies that such proprietary pages
would ever be problematic because consumers can get to any site from the AOL start-up page and, although
AOL does promote certain sites, in the future AOL "will not just promote AOL-Time Warner properties." Id.
While Case's first assertion is technologically true, it ignores the fact that many consumers implicitly trust
AOL and, because AOL's "easy-to-use" approach appeals most to novice computer users who may not
understand the range of available choices, consumers may be practicallylimited by start-up pages despite not
being actually limited. See Paula Felps, Why AOL? Despite Complaints, Millions of SubscribersJust Won't
Cut the Cord, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 20, 2000, at IF (discussing how the ease of use and familiarity
of AOL is helping the company retain old subscribers and gain new ones).
302. Imagine, for example, that when consumers call in to the MovieFone listings, Warner Brothers and
New Line films are always listed first. Although many movie-goers call to find out the running times for
specific movies they want to see, such behavior might be enough to steer previously-undecided consumers
toward AOL-Time Warner features. As such, the behavior would affect competition.
303. Hearings, supra note 67, at *30 (response of Steve Case, CEO AOL). In particular, Case has
alluded to what he calls "AOL TV," which is "a bit more personalized, a bit more interactive," and an
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With its dominant presence in the online service market and strong positions in the
media entertainment and cable systems markets, the new AOL-Time Warner would
certainly meet the "dangerous probability of success" criterion of a monopolization
attempt analysis. Given that the intent to monopolize is often inferred from conduct, a
unified AOL-Time Warner will have to tread lightly to avoid trampling competition and
running afoul of Sherman section 2.
3. Loss of Privacy and the Potentialfor Price Discrimination
A growing public policy concern regarding the AOL-Time Warner merger involves
subscribers' potential loss of privacy. Both AOL and Time Warner maintain subscriber
databases-given that such lists are already blamed for public harassment by telemarketers, some interest groups are concerned about the potential for abuse when AOL and
Time Warner merge and begin sharing their lists. When Senator Diane Feinstein raised
these concerns at the congressional hearings on the merger, Case and Levin downplayed
them, suggesting that "the real concern is... more likely to be the smaller companies"
because "the big companies... really recognize the importance of privacy... and
trust. ' 30 5 Feinstein also noted public alarm at the ways personal information, ranging
from Social Security numbers to financial data, is used for commercial purposes. In
response, Levin
and Case reiterated only that choice would be an integral part of AOL306
Time Warner.
One disturbing antitrust implication of information sharing in electronic commerce is
the increased potential for price discrimination, 30 7 which is prohibited by section 2 of the
Clayton Act as amended by section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Acte0 8 and section 5 of
the FTC Act. While there are a number of jurisdictional prerequisites, ° stated most
simply, price discrimination occurs when a seller charges two different prices for the
same goods. Price discriminating behavior is further subdivided based on whether those
harmed by the behavior are rival sellers 310 or buyers competing with each other, 31' but
the behavior required for a violation is substantially the same.
"electronic jukebox" that would be "a more convenient way to get music." Id.
304. See Rutenberg, supra note 297. Disney, particularly, is concerned about enhanced television
features-Disney's lobbyist has suggested that (1) Time Warner will block interactivity features of
competitors' programming to enhance its own, (2) that AOL-Time Warner on-screen programming guides will
favor Time Warner shows, and (3) that Time Warner will only allow its programming to utilize advanced
interactive advertising. See id.
305. Hearings,supra note 67, at *52 (response of Steve Case, CEO AOL).
306. See id. at *52-53.
307. See David A. Balto, Emerging Antitrust Issues in Electronic Commerce, Address to the 1999
Antitrust Institute (Nov. 12, 1999) (transcript available at the FTC website <http://www.ftc.gov/speechesl
other/ecommerce.htm>).
308. Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act of 1936, ch. 592, § 2, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994)). In pertinent part, this section now prohibits "any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which
discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
309. To come within the bounds of the Robinson-Patman Act, one of the sales must have crossed state
iines, there must have been a difference in price, not cost, between the two actual sales (offers are not enough),
the sales must have been of like quality goods or merchandise, and at least one of the sales must have occurred
in the United States. See Ill EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 19.5, 63-69
(1983).
310. So-called "primary line" price discrimination occurs when manufacturers discriminate in price to
harm rival manufacturers, i.e. others in the "primary line" of distribution. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (holding that defendants were guilty of price discrimination by
charging less in Utah for pies than competition could charge, and recouping those losses with higher prices in
Los Angeles).
311. In "secondary line" discrimination, different prices are charged to different buyers that are in
competition with one another-thus the harm is in the "secondary line" of the distribution scheme.
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As David Balto, the Assistant Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition's Office
of Policy and Evaluation, has explained, "certain aspects of electronic commerce...
allow the monopolist the ability to discriminate among groups of consumers. '31 2 As a
seller becomes increasingly aware of a buyer's financial status, purchasing habits, and
other information, the seller can better estimate the buyer's willingness to pay. 313 This,
in turn, gives the seller the ability to maximize its profits by tailoring prices to fit whichever consumer it is currently dealing with. 3 14 The competitive harm is committed
against the unwitting buyer, who thinks he has paid a fair price, when in reality, he may
have paid more because the seller knew the buyer was willing to pay more.
If AOL and Time Warner do merge, they will likely cross-promote as many products
as possible. While superficially this may benefit the consumer, in that he can shop for
more items or related items simultaneously, it also may allow AOL-Time Warner to
track purchasing habits. This kind of information, combined with the information already obtained from the consumer when they subscribe to either AOL or one of Time
Warner's services, might provide the united company with the kind of unfair selling
advantage Balto has described.
4. The Loss of JournalisticIntegrity
A final problem that concerns many public interest groups involves the notion of
journalistic integrity: consumer groups are increasingly worried about news that comes
from subdivisions of corporate entities. The AOL-Time Warner merger threatens to
combine an impressive collection of news organizations, the CNN Group, Time Magazine, and so forth, that is already linked to one corporate entity, Time Warner, with the
online portal through which a growing population receives its information.
Given the heated competition that currently exists in news reporting, 315 the proposed
merger could exacerbate tensions and flaws in the news industry. One can envision
AOL-Time Warner utilizing its news branches as either a shield, deflecting or downplaying scrutiny of AOL-Time Warner enterprises when necessary, or as a sword, investigating and attacking AOL-Time Warner's rivals under the guise of "news." Beyond even the proprietary concerns, however, one must also consider the intrinsic value
of impartial reporting to the public-some suggest that AOL-Time Warner has already
exerted its massive influence to affect the way a recent presidential debate was
covered.316 If such a claim were true, it would strike directly at the heart of the election
process and the government in general. When confronted with this charge during the
congressional hearings, however, Levin assured that "there is nothing more important to
[his] trusteeship at Time Warner-now AOL-Time Warner-than journalistic independence." 317 Consumer groups may have no choice but to hope that Levin's pledge is an
honest one if the merger proceeds.

312. Balto, supra note 307, at 10-11.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See Moore, supra note 174.
316. During the congressional questioning, Senator Kohl of Wisconsin related what he had observed
about the CNN-sponsored Democratic debate held in the Apollo Theater in New York the week before the
hearings. In particular, Senator Kohl noted that all of the panel of journalists were from Time Warner
organizations, as was the moderator, Internet questions were taken only from AOL or Time Warner websites,
and no journalists not affiliated with Time Warner were allowed inside the theater. See Hearings, supra note
67, at *37.
317. Id. (response of Gerald Levin, CEO Time Warner).
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IV. Conclusion

The preceding section of this Note touched upon several of the anti-competitive effects that could result if AOL and Time Warner are allowed to merge. And, although
the Guidelines suggest that the merger is not problematic, one can see from the mock
analysis that the Guidelines do not account for many of the ways in which AOL-Time
Warner could damage or influence its markets. While vertical mergers such as AOLTime Warner's do often produce pro-competitive effects, here the tremendous anticompetitive risk outweighs any potential benefit the merger could provide.
One last illustration may be necessary to demonstrate the point. The anticompetitive possibilities discussed in Part III are merely speculations; as such, their
inherent uncertainty may diminish their persuasiveness. In contrast, recent events have
provided a vivid and concrete picture of the potentially destructive power of a unified
AOL-Time Warner. On May 1, 2000, televisions tuned to ABC stations in such major
cities as New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Houston went black as Time Warner
stopped broadcasting the network on several of its cable systems. 318 The boycott was
the result of five months of hard-ball negotiations between Time Warner and ABC's
parent, Disney-the previous broadcast contract between the companies had expired in
December, but the two had agreed to monthly extensions ever since. 3 1 9 During the ensuing talks, Disney had demanded extensive concessions from Time Warner. These
included $300 million for the right to carry seven ABC stations, but also that Time Warner carry Disney's two newest channels and make the original Disney Channel part of
Time Warner's basic service package.320 While Time Warner agreed
to Disney's chan21
nel carriage demands, it bluntly refused to pay the $300 million.1
While Disney held ABC out as its trump card, Time Warner suspected that Disney's
motivation was to complete the contract before approval of the AOL merger.322 Disney,
like many other companies, has come to rely upon AOL subscribers for a substantial
portion of its online business and fears the loss of AOL "keyword status., 323 As such,
Disney would be in a much weaker position if bargaining with a united AOL-Time
Warner. With all this in mind, when Disney approached Time Warner in April with
another extension to continue broadcasting ABC through the end of the spring sweeps
period, Time Warner refused.324 Instead, Time Warner demanded an eight month extension; knowing that such a delay would ensure negotiations were resumed after approval
of the merger, Disney declined Time Warner' s terms.325
Time Warner then escalated the "game of corporate chicken ' 326 by blocking ABC
signals as soon as the previous extension expired at 12:01 a.m. on May 1.327 The move
made ABC unavailable in approximately 3.5 million households nationwide, depriving

318. See Rutenberg, supra note 297.
319. See id.
320. See id.; Bill Carter & Stephen Labaton, Heavily PressuredTime Warner Puts ABC Back on Cable,
for Now, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2000, at Al; John Dempsey, Levin Rips Retrans Regs at NCTA, DAILY
VARIETY, May 9, 2000, at 1.
321. See Rutenberg, supra note 297. Time Warner suggested that it would have to raise its subscriber
rates by $1 per month to cover the extra cost, a figure that Disney disputes. See Carter & Labaton, supra note
320.
322. See Carter & Labaton, supra note 320; Rutenberg, supra note 297.
323. The "keyword status" allows AOL users to jump directly from the AOL startup page to Disney's
homepage on the Web, without knowing a website address. See Eunjung Cha, supra note 218.
324. See Rutenberg, supra note 297.
325. See id.
326. Editorial, Battle of the Media Giants, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 2000, at A22.
327. See Carter & Labaton, supra note 320; Rutenberg, supra note 297.
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ABC of valuable sweeps ratings in several of the country's largest media markets.328 In
place of ABC programming, Time Warner televised a screen proclaiming that "Disney
has taken ABC away from you. ' 329 Disney struck back quickly through the media,
however, claiming that Time Warner's actions were "thoroughly outrageous," and arguing that once it had offered the May extension, Time Warner was required to
accept.33° Meanwhile, Disney also distributed 18,000 free satellite dishes in an attempt
to influence Time Warner's cable subscribers to switch to satellite providers, and appealed to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") for assistance. 331
Finally, thirty-nine hours after it had begun, Time Warner ended the blackout,
agreeing to a new July 15 deadline with Disney; the truce was announced just as the
FCC was preparing to rule in Disney's favor.332 Although the FCC still released statements full of harsh rhetoric against Time Warner, had the agency actually been forced to
intervene, it could have only charged
Time Warner with a violation due to the timing of
333
the boycott, not the conduct itself.
The country was stunned by the ABC blackout, even after it had ended. It was the
lead story in every major newspaper. 334 It inspired endless editorials and op-ed
pieces.335 But the ABC blackout was significant for more than just the public reaction it
provoked. First, the boycott illustrated Time Warner's tremendous arrogance: Time
Warner did not target some weakling, but instead struck directly at Disney, its top competitor among the media conglomerates. Remember that, unlike AOL, which has clearly
dominated its market for years, Time Warner has always been considered one of several
major players in the media entertainment industry. Instead, the boycott demonstrated
that Time Warner has power that its rival conglomerates cannot match-its cable systems allow it to directly attack its competitors by removing them from viewers' screens.
And, especially for channels that are only available on cable, Time Warner's subscribers
have no choice but to endure such a boycott or switch to a satellite alternative.
Second, and perhaps more even more troubling, the ABC blackout was significant
because Time Warner accomplished it acting alone. Despite the "competition" among
the conglomerates, and before it ever gained access to AOL's hold on online users, Time
Warner was powerful enough to challenge Disney and win. It has been said repeatedly
that the antitrust laws exist not to protect competitors, but to protect competition.336
Competition in the media industry barely survived a boycott by an independent Time
328. See Rutenberg, supra note 297. But see Carter & Labaton, supra note 320 (suggesting that "ABC's
ratings were not severely affected").
329. See Rutenberg, supra note 297; see also Jim Rutenberg, Reconstructing the Genesis of a Blunder,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8,2000, at C20.
330. Rutenberg, supia note 297.
331. See Carter & Labaton, supra note 320; Rutenberg, supra note 297.
332. See Carter & Labaton, supra note 320; Rutenberg, supra note 297.
333. See, e.g., Carter & Labaton, supra note 320 (quoting FCC chairman William Kennard that "[t]he
television sets of average consumers should never be held hostage in these disputes" and noting that the FCC
had concluded that the Time Warner boycott violated a 1993 commission regulation prohibiting a cable system
from pulling a broadcaster during a ratings sweeps month).
334.
335.
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All, Folks!, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2000, at A27 (beginning with the African proverb "when elephants fight, itis
the grass that suffers" and concluding that "[c]oncentration of power over what we see in the news-and even
if we see a competitor's news-is a danger to democracy"); Editorial, The Elephants Fight, WASH. POST, May
4, 2000, at A24; Editorial, Who Wants to Be a Monopoly?, Cm. TRm., May 4, 2000, at N22.
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Warner-just imagine what Time Warner could and will do once it joins forces with
AOL and obtains access to almost ninety percent of the country's online service subscribers. What company will be too big for a unified AOL-Time Warner to challenge,
threaten, or cajole?
Fortunately, the ABC blackout has raised public awareness and concern about the
merger.337 But, ultimately, the fate of the media industry as we now know it lies with
the FTC. If the FTC has been paying attention, and if it acts responsibly, the FTC will
go beyond the formalisms of the Guidelines and reject the AOL-Time Warner merger
outright. However, if the FTC flinches, it is we the consumers-we who watch the
movies, read the books, listen to the music, and surf the Web-that will pay the price in
the long run.
Joseph P. Reid*
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